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PRIVATE STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW
Peter L. Strauss*
Legal information institutes of the world, meeting in Montreal, declare
that:
• Public legal information from all countries and international insti-
tutions is part of the common heritage of humanity. Maximising
access to this information promotes justice and the rule of law;
• Public legal information is digital common property and should be
accessible to all on a non-profit basis and free of charge;
• Organizations such as legal information institutes have the right
to publish public legal information and the government bodies
that create or control that information should provide access to it
so that it can be published by other parties.1
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks are due to many others, including:
the participants in the Comparative Administrative Law symposium in Luxembourg, June 5–6,
2012; Joe Bhatia and Scott Cooper of the American National Standards Association; Rae
McQuade of the North American Energy Standards Board; Carl Malamud of Public.Resource
.org; Emily Schleicher Bremer of the Administrative Conference of the United States; Professor
Bruce Ackerman; and my colleagues Jane Ginsberg, David Pozen, William Simon, and
Timothy Wu. Jared Miller, J.D. 2014, provided indispensable research assistance. Extraordi-
nary, too, has been the work of the staff of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, who have
doubled the number of footnotes in this Article and, in the course of that effort, updated much
of its supporting data. The text, virtually unchanged from my submission, is entirely my own.
Readers should be aware that, although attempting a balanced account here, I am an inter-
ested party, having filed the petition for rulemaking discussed at some length within, and which
lies behind the body of commentary to the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA) and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) often called in follow-
ing footnotes. These are FDMS dockets NARA-12-0002 and OMB-2012-0003, which may be
found at http://www.regulations.gov. (Note that subsequent footnotes omit the location of the
FDMS dockets, and take the form FDMS Docket XXXX-2012-YYYY or, for specific docu-
ments in the docket, FDMS Docket XXXX-2012-YYYY-ZZZZ.) I am an active member of the
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice section of the American Bar Association; though
my efforts contributed to its interest in the matter, I did not significantly contribute to its com-
ments filed in these dockets.
While some editorial revisions have been more recently made, substantive changes in this
Article ended in early October 2013. To permit its publication here, developments subsequent
to the Office of Federal Register’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, published on October 2,
2013, have not been addressed.
1 WORLD LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.worldlii.org/worldlii/declaration/montreal_en
.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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We hear of tyrants, and those cruel ones: but, whatever we may have
felt, we have never heard of any tyrant in such sort cruel, as to punish
men for disobedience to laws or orders which he had kept them from
the knowledge of.2
ABSTRACT
Simplified, universal access to law is one of the important transformations worked
by the digital age. With the replacement of physical by digital copies, citizens ordinarily
need travel only to the nearest computer to find and read the texts that bind them. Lag-
ging behind this development, however, has been computer access to standards devel-
oped by private standards development organizations, often under the umbrella of the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and then converted by agency actions
incorporating them by reference into legal obligations. To discover what colors the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires for use in work-place
caution signs, one must purchase from ANSI the standard OSHA has referenced in its
regulations, at the price ANSI chooses to charge for it.
The regulations governing incorporation by reference as a federal matter have not
been revised since 1982, and therefore do not address the changes the digital age has
brought about in what it means for incorporated matter to be “reasonably available,” as
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) requires. This Article seeks to bridge that gap, suggesting a variety
of approaches that might bring the use of incorporation by reference into conformity
with modern rulemaking practices and respect the general proposition that documents
stating citizens’ legal obligations are not subject to copyright, while at the same time
both honoring clear federal statutory policy favoring the use of privately developed stan-
dards in rulemaking and respecting the needs standards organizations have to find rea-
sonable means to support the costs of their operations. Business models created in the
age of print need to change; the challenge is to find ways to permit the market in pri-
vately developed voluntary standards to thrive, without thereby permitting the monopoly
pricing of access to governing law.
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2 JEREMY BENTHAM, JUSTICE AND CODIFICATION PETITIONS 4 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1992) (1829). Erwin N. Griswold used this as the epigram to his Government in Ignorance
of the Law—A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198,
198 (1934).
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INTRODUCTION
A. Voluntary Consensus Standards
This Article addresses the public/private confusions over standards developing
organizations’ work. Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) are private non-
governmental bodies that have long existed to create voluntary private standards by
which to declare or measure the characteristics of goods on the marketplace. Throughout
the world, manufacturing and markets are greatly aided, and consumers offered protec-
tion, by the application of uniform industrial standards created independent of law, as
means of assuring quality, compatibility, and other highly desired market characteristics.
They define what is meant by U.S. Hard Red Spring wheat,3 reflect railroads’ agreement
on track widths permitting interchangeability,4 establish threading conventions for
nuts and bolts,5 or fix the characteristics of the fittings that attach fire hoses to
3 GIPSA, Subpart M—U.S. Standards for Wheat (2006), available at http://www.gipsa
.usda.gov/fgis/standards/810wheat.pdf (now defining the U.S. standards for wheat by the
Department of Agriculture).
4 See Robert N. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development
of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1332–33
& nn.5–6 (1978). See generally Douglas J. Puffert, The Standardization of Track Gauge on
North American Railways, 1830–1890, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 933 (2000) (discussing the standard-
ization of railroads).
5 For the British Eighth Army, fighting Rommel in North Africa:
British replacements for worn-out parts on their American-made tanks
reached the British armed forces just in time—only to be unusable due to
literally incompatible nuts and bolts. Differences in British and American
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hydrants.6 Independent of any legal force they might have, Underwriters Laboratories
(UL) tags on electric appliances offer buyers assurance of their safety.7 The thousands
of “voluntary consensus standards” that SDOs develop for industrial conduct are un-
deniably beneficial to the operation of markets in complex goods and to public safety.
Hundreds of private SDOs exist in the United States alone. Under the umbrella of
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),8 one finds professional organiza-
tions of individual engineers such as the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM),9 corporate-membership trade associations such as the American Petroleum
Institute (API),10 and corporations in the business of certifying safety, such as UL.11
Abroad, there is a greater tendency to coordinated national bodies,12 like the British
Standards Institute (BSI),13 or international bodies, such as the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN),14 the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
(CENELEC),15 and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).16
This Article is particularly concerned with American SDOs, primarily ANSI and
the SDOs it has accredited for the generation of “voluntary consensus standards.”17 Not
all standards fit the description “voluntary consensus standards”; some (for example, the
threading standards—established in the 1840s and 1860s, respectively—
thus forced the British commanders to abandon tanks and equipment
in the North African desert . . . add[ing] some 25 million to the cost
of war.
TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 130 (2011).
6 The great Baltimore fire of 1904 became worse when fire companies called in from
Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and other cities found they could not attach their hoses to the
city’s hydrants. See Tyler R.T. Wolf, Existing in a Legal Limbo: The Precarious Legal Position
of Standards-Development Organizations, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807, 808 (2008).
7 See UL Product Safety, UL, http://www.ul.com/global/eng/pages/offerings/businesses
/productsafety (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
8 About ANSI Overview, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx
?menuid=1 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
9 About ASTM Int’l, ASTM, http://www.astm.org/ABOUT/overview.html (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
10 About API, API, http://www.api.org/globalitems/globalheaderpages/about-api (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
11 See UL Product Safety, supra note 7.
12 Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli offer a comprehensive and engaging view of global stan-
dards and their impact. See generally BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5.
13 About BSI, BSI GRP., http://www.bsigroup.com/en-Gb/about-bsi (last visited Dec. 12,
2013).
14 CEN—EUROPEAN COMM. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.cen.eu/cen/AboutUs
/pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
15 About CENELEC—Who we are, CENELEC, http://www.cenelec.eu/aboutcenelec/who
weare/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
16 About ISO, ISO, http://iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
17 See About ANSI Overview, supra note 8.
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standards for Blu-ray computer discs18) may simply be created by a manufacturer hope-
ful of capturing a certain market; others may be the product of organizations addressing
compatibility issues in rapidly developing technologies without seeking to engage wide
participation in their work. As the name may suggest, “voluntary consensus standards”
are developed using procedures whose breadth of reach and interactive characteristics
resemble governmental rulemaking, with adoption requiring an elaborate process of
development, reaching a monitored consensus among those responsible within the
SDO.19 ANSI’s “Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American
National Standards”20 provides, in twenty-six detailed pages, a set of procedures both
for accreditation and audit of SDOs wishing to develop American National Standards
and for the consideration of individual standards. Standards, once adopted, are copy-
righted as the intellectual property of the developing SDO and offered for sale through
ANSI, SDO websites, or third-party publishers.21 Although SDOs are generally non-
profit organizations and rely heavily on the voluntary work of engineers or others
versed in the technical issues involved, fulfilling the required procedures imposes
administrative costs that must somehow be financed.22 For the professional societies,
if not for the trade associations or corporate developers of standards, these costs are sub-
stantially financed through membership dues paid to participate in their processes and
through the sale of their copyrighted standards.23
Although anti-competitive uses of standards are not unknown, and success in estab-
lishing one’s preferences as an international standard, especially, may have significant
18 General Info, BLU-RAY DISC ASS’N, http://www.blu-raydisc.com/en/association/general
info.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
19 See Mark I. Marpet, An Ethical Issue in Voluntary-Consensus Standards Development:
A Decision-Science View, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1701, 1701 (1998).
20 See ANSI’s “Essential Requirements” for standards generation. ANSI Essential Require-
ments: Due Process Requirements for American National Standards, ANSI (last updated Jan.
2013) [hereinafter ANSI Essential Requirements], available at http://www.ansi.org/essential
requirements.
21 See, e.g., infra notes 75, 138, 343 and accompanying text.
22 “Not-for-profit” indicates an accepted public-serving purpose, freedom from taxation, and
the absence of shareholders (owners) who might be paid dividends out of a surplus resulting
from an excess of revenue over expenditures. Expenditures, however, may include compensa-
tion packages that, for high-ranking executives or for university football coaches, can reach
seven figures. See, e.g., Comment from Carl Malamud, President, Public.Resource.org, NARA-
12-0002-0082 (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12
-0002-0082 (listing table of salaries for executives at leading SDOs, ranging from $420,960
to $2,075,984). The possibility that the prices set by SDOs are self-serving, then, cannot
be excluded.
23 See, e.g., Content Strategy, NFPA, http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-digital
-products/nfpa-product-development-and-innovation (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (remarking in
one breath: “We have had great success over the years using a business model in which the prin-
cipal source of revenue was the sale of print editions of our codes and standards.” The document
next observes “[t]hat business model is no longer sustainable.”). This is the reality with which
this Article is concerned.
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financial consequences for participants in international markets—favoring some and
imposing additional costs on others24—standards are, on the whole, both necessary and
beneficial. Complex markets could not operate without them. The processes ANSI and
other organizations have developed to ensure consensus and provide safeguards against
their abuse seem generally effective and, within the industrial community as a whole,
there is every motivation to support them. This Article takes no issue with their develop-
ment and use as voluntary consensus standards and accepts that, at least where standards
may compete with one another,25 market forces may work to control owners’ exploita-
tion of copyrights in them.
B. Their Occasional Conversion Into Legal Obligations
Increasingly, American governments—federal, state, and local—have been adopting
part or all of some of these standards—e.g., what standardized colors should be used
for caution signs in a work-place—as regulatory requirements.26 Incorporation by refer-
ence at the state and local level greatly eases the work of both governments and arms
markets. If the Southern Building Code Congress International27 and its competitors28
had not drawn up model building codes, each small town would have been obliged to
develop its own, at high cost and low efficiency; as a result, builders and manufacturers
of building materials might have found their markets extraordinarily complex. With a
model code in place, builders will know that materials meeting its standards are accept-
able for construction, and material suppliers will learn what qualities in their goods will
likely satisfy the market as a whole. For example, what benefits the village of Hastings
on Hudson may also benefit the maker and users of nuclear power plant equipment with
standards developed by the American Nuclear Society (ANS)29—as well, it may be
hoped, as neighbors to the plant wishing assurance of its safety. For a commercial
builder, too, the cost of acquiring copies of the relevant adopted codes is likely trivial
in relation to its other expenses; but for the homeowner who wishes himself to make
code-compliant alterations in his own home, this may not be true, and in that possibility
lies much of the impulse for this Article.
At the federal level, the conversion of standards into legal obligations through in-
corporation by reference had its origin primarily in a wish to protect the utility of the
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, reducing their otherwise
necessary size by thousands of printed pages, and secondarily in the hope of giving a
24 See BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5.
25 Id.
26 See infra notes 232–33.
27 About ICC, ICC, http://www.iccsafe.org/aboutICC/pages/default.aspx (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
28 Competitors include the Building Officials Code Administrators International (BOCA),
id., the International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO), id., International Code Council
(ICC), id., and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Content Strategy, supra
note 23.
29 Standards, ANS, http://www.ans.org/standards (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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kick-start to new federal safety programs, by converting to legal obligations consen-
sus standards already in place. The American Administrative Procedure Act (APA)30
has long required the publication of legally binding agency regulations in both the
federal daily journal of record, the Federal Register, and the compendium of regula-
tions, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).31 No one would claim that the material
thus published is subject to copyright; but when industry standards are incorporated
by reference, they are merely identified by name and source. Their contents are not
published—that is, indeed, the point in protecting the volume of the Federal Register
and the CFR—and to know those contents one must ordinarily purchase them from
their copyright owner. Section 552(a)(1) of the APA states a procedure for incorpo-
ration by reference, that offers no direct guidance on the question whether an SDO’s
standard incorporated not as a possible technical means for compliance, but as law,
remains in the copyright control of its creator:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the
Federal Register for the guidance of the public— . . .
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as autho-
rized by law, and statements of general policy or interpreta-
tions of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of
the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to
resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be pub-
lished in the Federal Register and not so published. For the purpose
of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of per-
sons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register
when incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the
Director of the Federal Register.32
The Director has implemented this provision by regulations discussed within that at
present do not define what it means for matter to be “reasonably available” beyond
requiring single copies to be deposited with the National Archives and retained in
agency libraries.33
More recent measures, and the realities of shrinking federal regulatory resources,
have both encouraged the practice of incorporation, and created a federal framework
30 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006)).
31 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
32 § 552(a)(1) (emphasis added). This section is now referred to as the Freedom of
Information Act.
33 See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text; infra notes 264–66 and accompany-
ing text.
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for participation and oversight. The Reagan administration, noted generally for its de-
regulatory emphasis, formulated an OMB Circular, A-119,34 strongly encouraging a
preference for privately generated standards over agency-generated standards where the
former were available.35 In 1988, the transformation of the National Bureau of Stan-
dards—the guardian of national standards for weights, measures, and the like—into the
Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) pro-
vided a bureaucracy to implement this preference.36 During President Clinton’s admin-
istration, passage of the National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA)37 gave Circular A-119 statutory force by requiring federal agencies to “use
technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bod-
ies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activi-
ties,” absent a specific finding of their inadequacy.38 Although “technical standards” are
defined in a way that focuses on interoperability39 and appears to suppose the existence
of independently stated regulatory requirements and consequent likely diminished inter-
est outside regulated communities, even before the NTTAA, it was estimated that ten
percent or more of ANSI standards related to the health and safety of industrial products
and processes.40 The most recent revisions to Circular A-119 in 1998 instruct agencies
to take steps to assure openness, balance, transparency, consensus and due process in
the procedures SDOs use to develop qualifying standards,41 and, like the NTTAA
34 See OMB, Circular No. A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Feb. 19, 1998).
35 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-390, at 25 (1995) (recounting the history of Circular A-119).
36 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5111–
5115, 102 Stat. 1427 (1988).
37 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110
Stat. 775 (1996).
38 Id. § 12(d)(1).
39 Id. § 12(d)(4). Subsection (4) defines “technical standards” as “performance-based or
design-specific technical specifications and related management systems practices.” Id.
40 See ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS 22 (1990) (stating that 900 out of 8,500 ANSI standards then-existing were
considered to relate to health and safety).
41 4. What Are Voluntary, Consensus Standards?
a. For purposes of this policy, “voluntary consensus standards” are
standards developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies,
both domestic and international. These standards include provisions re-
quiring that owners of relevant intellectual property have agreed to make
that intellectual property available on a non-discriminatory, royalty-free
or reasonable royalty basis to all interested parties. For purposes of this
Circular, “technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standard bodies” is an equivalent term.
(1) “Voluntary consensus standards bodies” are domestic or interna-
tional organizations which plan, develop, establish, or coordinate volun-
tary consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures. For purposes of
this Circular, “voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies,”
as cited in Act, is an equivalent term. The Act and the Circular encourage
the participation of federal representatives in these bodies to increase the
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itself,42 provide support for federal agency participation in those activities.43 The result
is to give further impetus to the ANSI “Essential Requirements.”44
Although Circular A-119 states its application only to “technical standards,” con-
temporary reports of the use of standards afford no ready means of determining what
proportion of them effectively do impose regulatory requirements, and the OFR, in
administering § 552(a)(1), insists that incorporated matter must be a “requirement.”45
The use of standards in lieu of independent federal rulemaking is indeed widespread.
In its most recent report for Fiscal 2012,46 NIST found that only one agency, the
Department of Labor, had reported adopting a government-unique rather than an SDO
standard in the preceding year (and that one incorporated nine SDO standards into a
likelihood that the standards they develop will meet both public and pri-
vate sector needs. A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by the
following attributes:
(i) Openness.
(ii) Balance of interest.
(iii) Due process.
(iv) An appeals process.
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not nec-
essarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to resolve
objections by interested parties, as long as all comments have been
fairly considered, each objector is advised of the disposition of his or
her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the consensus body mem-
bers are given an opportunity to change their votes after reviewing
the comments . . . .
OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8554 (Feb. 19, 1998).
42 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
§ 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. 775 (1996).
43 7. What Is The Policy For Federal Participation In Voluntary Consensus
Standards Bodies?
Agencies must consult with voluntary consensus standards bodies,
both domestic and international, and must participate with such bodies in
the development of voluntary consensus standards when consultation and
participation is in the public interest and is compatible with their mis-
sions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources . . . .
OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8555–56 (Feb. 19, 1998).
44 See ANSI Essential Requirements, supra note 20.
45 Its view apparently rests on § 552(a)(1)’s obligation on agencies to “publish in the
Federal Register . . . (D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
law . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006). The same subsection, however, also refers to the
Federal Register publication of “statements of general policy or interpretations of general appli-
cability formulated and adopted by the agency,” so that the subsection explicitly permits agen-
cies to incorporate by reference soft, as well as hard, law instruments. Id.; see infra note 177.
Incorporation by reference of soft law, as will be developed within, would avoid most, if not all,
of the difficulties currently experienced.
46 Nathalie Rioux, Sixteenth Annual Report on Federal Agency Use of Voluntary Consensus
Standards and Conformity Assessment, NIST (Apr. 2013), available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov
/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7930.pdf.
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single rule).47 In contrast, NIST reported the adoption of 423 new SDO standards, many
as substitutes for existing, government-unique standards.48 Nor have agencies been
standing by as standards are developed. In Fiscal 2012, NIST reported, agency personnel
participated in 552 SDOs.49 As of this writing, a “Standards Incorporated by Reference”
database maintained by NIST50 lists 10,613 standards referred to in the CFR,51 and 363
organizations (largely but not exclusively SDOs52) whose standards are referred to53—
ranging from 2,254 times for the American Society for Testing and Materials54 to 107
whose standards are referred to only once.55
It is important to be aware that most of the standards referred to in the CFR and
converted into legal obligations no longer reflect prevailing voluntary consensus stan-
dards. ANSI generally requires that standards it certifies be revisited at least every five
years, and their modification through its voluntary consensus process is common. But
OFR is firmly of the view, understandable in the context of American rulemaking law,
that once agency rulemaking has converted a standard into a binding requirement, as
it insists must be done to incorporate it by reference,56 it can be changed only by fresh
rulemaking; and OFR permits incorporation only of particular, precisely identified and
existing standards, so that a rule cannot validly incorporate future revisions. Although
rulemaking changes would inevitably lag a bit behind the voluntary consensus process,
the costs of rulemaking and limitations on agency resources have resulted in incor-
porated standards being left in place as legal obligations long after they have been
abandoned by their creators as voluntary standards. Thus, the majority of standards in-
corporated into federal regulations were incorporated before 1996—some, even decades
before.57 Comments in the FDMS dockets of two recent inquiries into incorporation
by reference issues identify numerous incorporated standards, still law, that are un-
available58 or have subsequently been revealed to be inadequate or even dangerous.59
47 Id. at 1.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database Homepage, NIST, http://
standards.gov/sibr/query/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.main (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
51 Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database: Regulatory SIBR (R-SIBR)
Statistics, NIST, https://standards.gov/sibr/query/index.cfm?fuseaction=rsibr.total_regulatory
_sibr (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
52 This includes government bodies.
53 Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database: List of Standards Developing
Organizations (SDO) listed in the CFR, NIST, https://standards.gov/sibr/query/index.cfm?fuse
action=rsibr.complete_regulatory_sibr (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See infra note 177.
57 See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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SDOs’ copyright claims on standards do not lapse with their abandonment as vol-
untary consensus standards, so if a standard has been incorporated by reference its
ostensible copyright endures for the life of the rule incorporating it. Circular A-119
specifically calls on agencies to respect SDO copyrights,60 and, indeed, the behavior of
American governments in relation to incorporated standards has generally worked to
preserve those claims. Rather than publishing the standards’ texts in their regulations,
they simply refer the readers of their regulations to the standards which they have
“incorporated by reference.”61 Under a regime that requires only two print copies to
be kept in government depositories in Washington D.C. or its near suburbs, and makes
no current provision for internet access,62 the only practical course for someone in
Minnesota, California, or Alabama who is affected by and wishes to learn the resulting
law, will usually be to purchase the standard from the SDO whose intellectual property
it is, at whatever price that organization chooses to set.
C. And Hence the Problem to Be Discussed
This fact frames the basic concern of this Article, raising a question that to lawyers
might appear simply rhetorical: If standards have been made into law, don’t they have
to be public? Don’t American citizens and companies have a right to read laws govern-
ing their conduct without having to pay the monopoly price a valid copyright would per-
mit a private organization “owning” that legal obligation to charge for permitting access
to it, on such terms as it chose to require? As the U.S. Copyright Office well knows,63
law is not subject to copyright.64 The Information Age now makes it trivial to provide
access that may have been more difficult in the age of print, and federal agencies in
particular have for almost two decades been under a statutory duty to make all regula-
tions and other matter affecting private conduct available in the electronic reading
rooms they are obliged to maintain.65 All materials placed there are freely available to
anyone with access to the Internet.
60 OMB Cir. A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).
61 Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database, NIST, http://standards.gov/sibr
/query/index.cfm?fuseaction+rsibr.total_regulatory_sibr (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
62 See 49 C.F.R. § 192.7(b) (1993).
63 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRAC-
TICES § 206.01 (1984) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM II] (“Edicts of government, such as judicial
opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official
legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.2 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2013) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine
an area of creative endeavor in which the copyright incentive is needed less [than for stan-
dards generation].”).
64 See Wheaton v. Peters, 53 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834); see also COMPENDIUM II, supra
note 63, at § 206.01.
65 See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
§ 4, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2012)); see also E-
Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 207(f)(1), 116 Stat. 2899, 2918 (2002).
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Yet the question is not rhetorical. If we were to impair the SDOs’ markets for their
standards, how would they support their undeniably beneficial work? With good reason,
moreover, many SDOs will assert that those directly governed by a particular standard
should find the cost of obtaining it comparable to a law school casebook’s cost and—
similarly—both trivial in relation to their other costs and beneficial to them in avoiding
the otherwise substantial cost of personally obtaining the same information. These asser-
tions, however, overlook two important countervailing considerations: (1) the interests
many who are not affected businesses may have in knowing what the standards are66 and
(2) the way in which conversion of a voluntary standard into a legal requirement can dis-
tort the market for that standard.
The first of these considerations may be illustrated by the recent request of a House
of Representatives committee to obtain for its review a standard governing required
public warnings about pipeline safety that the API had developed, and that the federal
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) had incorporated
by reference into its regulations.67 The API asked the committee to pay it $1,195 for the
privilege.68 In the PHMSA’s required notice of proposed rulemaking, the Federal
Register had provided to its readers only the identity of the API standard it was propos-
ing to make a legal obligation—neither its text nor any supporting data or reasoning.69
66 Comment from Bill Taylor, Legislative and Regulatory Representative, Pub. Agency
Safety Mgmt. Ass’n–S. Chapter, NARA-12-0002-0117 (May 23, 2012), http://www.regulations
.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0117.
67 Introduction to Standards Incorporated by Reference, PHMSA, http://phmsa.dot.gov
/portal/site/PHMSA/menuitem.ebdc7a8a7e39f2e55cf2031050248a0c/?vgnextoid=d5af7147
69382310VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD&vgnextchannel=f0b8a535eac17110VgnVCM
1000009ed07898RCRD&vgnextfmt=print (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
68 David Halperin, VIDEO: Industry Group Insist on Charging You $1,195 to Read a
Public Law, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidhalperin
/video-industry-group-ins_b_1527397.html.
69 Comment from David Halperin & Carl Malamud, Public.Resource.org, OMB-2012-0003-
0008, at 14 (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012
-0003-0008 [hereinafter Halperin & Malamud, OMB Comment]; see also Comment from David
Halperin & Carl Malamud, Public.Resource.org, NARA-12-0002-0109 (Apr. 12, 2012), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0109 [hereinafter Halperin &
Malamud, NARA Comment]. Although the API eventually retracted this demand, it catalyzed
the passage of section 24 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of
2011, which provides that in the future “the Secretary [of Transportation] may not issue guid-
ance or a regulation [concerning pipeline safety] that incorporates by reference any documents
or portions thereof unless the documents or portions thereof are made available to the public,
free of charge, on an Internet Web site.” Pub. L. No. 112-90, 123 Stat. 1919 (2012), available
at http://www.gpo.gov. The PHMSA’s and industry’s distress over this statute occasioned a July
13, 2012, conference on the issues; until fall 2013 its files are online. See Public Workshop:
Implementing Incorporation by Reference Requirements of Section 24 of the Pipeline Safety
Act of 2011, PHMSA, http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSA/menuitem.ebdc7a8a7e39f2
e55cf2031050248a0c/?vgnextoid=3c76b62089ce7310VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD
&vgnextchannel=d248724dd7d6c010VgnVCM10000080e8a8c0RCRD&vgnextfmt=print
(last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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Once the standard had been incorporated into the PHMSA’s regulations, all the CFR
told readers was that they must obey the identified API standard, which they could
either inspect at the National Archives or the agency, or purchase from the API.70 In ad-
dition to the House committee, many persons not “in the business” could have a signifi-
cant interest in knowing the content of a standard that was important, and perhaps
inadequate, to assuring public safety. For them, a “trivial cost of doing business” argu-
ment is unconvincing.71
The “trivial cost of doing business” argument is also challenged by settings that may
require the purchase of numerous standards. Purchasing Underwriters Laboratories’
(UL) fifty-two-page Standard UL38, “Standard for Manual Signaling Boxes for Fire
Alarm Systems,”72 incorporated by reference in many municipal codes,73 costs $502 for
a hard copy ($998 if one also wishes a three-year subscription to its future revisions,
interpretations, etc.).74 If one were also to purchase all the other UL standards referred
to in those fifty-two pages as elements of the standard—five of which are referred to
secondarily and an additional twenty-seven of which are referred to in one of those sec-
ondary standards—the total cost would exceed $10,000.75
As for market distortion and monopoly pricing, consider the electronic bookshop
of the American Herbal Products Association (AHPA).76 The AHPA publishes Herbs
of Commerce,77 a book setting standards “by which all plant common and scientific
names will be determined on all products containing herbs.”78 After the AHPA pub-
lished the first edition of this book in 1992, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) incorporated it by reference as one element of its regulation specifying the
70 49 C.F.R. § 192.7 (2012).
71 Nor is it convincing for small businesses when these costs are considered in the aggregate.
Even if the cost of particular standards is slight, the cumulative costs of the standards they must
be aware of can be quite forbidding. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
72 UL 38 Standard for Manual Signaling Boxes for Fire Alarm Systems, UL, http://www.ul
.com/global/eng/pages/solutions/standards/accessstandards/catalogofstandards/standard/?id
=38_8 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
73 See, e.g., NEW REQUIREMENT UNDER UL 38 MANUALLY ACTUATED SIGNALING BOXES,
CALIFORNIA STATE FIRE MARSHAL (Oct. 15, 2007), http://osfm.fire.ca.gov/informationbulletin
/pdf/2007/ul38.pdf.
74 See Product Details: UL 38, COMM 2000, http://www.comm-2000.com/productdetails
.aspx?sendingPageType=BigBrowser&CatalogID=Standards&ProductID=UL38_8_S_2008
0704(ULStandards2) (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
75 UL sells its standards online. COMM 2000, http://www.comm-2000.com (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013). This website may be searched for UL Standard 38. See id. UL standard 746C,
Standard for Polymeric Materials—Use in Electrical Equipment Evaluations, one of the five
standards referenced in UL 38, in turn references twenty-eight unique other UL standards,
whose individual prices are often hundreds of dollars higher. See id.
76 AHPA, http://www.ahpa.org (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
77 Bookstore, AHPA, http://www.ahpa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=357 (last visited Dec. 12,
2013) (search for “Herbs of Commerce 2nd edition”).
78 Id.
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required nomenclature for the ingredients of dietary supplements.79 The AHPA offers
this edition on its website for $250,80 on condition that it is “[a]vailable only in PDF
format . . . [and] may not be printed, transferred or sold.”81 In 2000, it published a sec-
ond edition considering 2,048 different items,82 which it understandably characterizes
as “[a] must-have for anyone who writes about or manufactures herbal products.”83 One
would think this more modern edition commercially more valuable, but the FDA has
not yet incorporated its terms into law by reference. The AHPA offers this edition on
the same web page for $99.99 for non-members, without stated use restrictions.84 Thus,
it charges $150 more for an out-of-date standard that nonetheless is law than for its
“must-have edition for anyone who writes about or manufactures herbal products.”85
This is monopoly pricing of law, not copyright pricing to the market for voluntary con-
sensus standards. It is a price utterly dependent on the fact that the outdated first edition
is still law that the FDA can enforce and manufacturers are therefore obligated to obey.
The API and AHPA are trade associations;86 UL is a not-for-profit corporation in
the business of certifying the safety of electrical goods, whose standards state the condi-
tions a good must satisfy to earn the UL certified label.87 Professional societies like the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)88 seem, in general, to charge those
who purchase their standards lower prices, even though these societies are more depen-
dent on the resulting revenues to support their standard-generating work.89 Yet the
number of standards a small business must know and comply with may still make the
purchase a substantial economic burden.90 Although the OMB’s Memorandum A-119
79 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.4(h) (2013) (“The common or usual name of ingredients of dietary
supplements that are botanicals (including fungi and algae) shall be consistent with the names
standardized in Herbs of Commerce, 1992 edition, which is incorporated by reference in accor-
dance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) and 1 C.F.R. part 51. Copies may be obtained from the American
Herbal Products Association, 8484 Georgia Ave., Suite 370, Silver Spring, MD 20910, 301-
588-1171 , FAX 301-588-1174, e-mail: ahpa@ahpa.org, or may be examined at the Center
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition’s Library, 5100 Paint Branch Pkwy., College Park, MD
20740, or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).”). That two physical
copies may be available for inspection in Washington, D.C. or its near suburb seems unlikely
to mean much to an herbalist in Minnesota, California, or Alabama.
80 Bookstore, supra note 77.
81 Id. (listing Herbs of Commerce, 1st Edition, at a non-member price of $250).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 About API, API, http://www.api.org (last visited Dec. 12, 2013); AHPA, supra note 76.
87 About UL, UL, http://www.ul.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
88 About ASME, ASME, https://www.asme.org/about-asme (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
89 See, e.g., Books, ASME, https://www.asme.org/shop/books?cm_re=Home-_-Global
Heade_-_Books (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (listing prices from as low as $20).
90 See Comment from Jerry Call, Executive Vice President, Am. Foundry Soc’y, NARA-
12-0002-0147, at 1–2 (June 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA
-12-0002-0147 (“$75 is not much for a standard, but a typical small manufacturer, including
2013] PRIVATE STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 511
characterizes voluntary consensus standards as characterized by “provisions requiring
that owners of relevant intellectual property have agreed to make that intellectual prop-
erty available on a non-discriminatory, royalty-free or reasonable royalty basis to all
interested parties,” no mechanism exists for registration or oversight of royalty reason-
ableness—indeed for monitoring any aspect of standards’ marketing once incorporation
by reference has occurred. Even at the outset, no law or regulation controls the prices
that may be asked, or distinguishes among the types of SDO generating a standard that
happens to have been adopted into law.
The paragraphs that follow take up a series of interrelated issues and suggestions:
(1) the uncertain state of the caselaw on the copyrightability of standards that have been
converted into law; (2) the existing federal regime for regulation incorporation by refer-
ence and suggestions for its modernization; techniques for preserving the viability of
copyright; and (3) techniques for avoiding monopoly pricing of standards converted
into law.
I. THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF THE CASELAW ON THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF
STANDARDS THAT HAVE BEEN CONVERTED INTO LAW
No doubt attends the copyrightability of voluntary consensus standards as such. But
when they cease to be voluntary, when all or part of a standard has been converted into
legal obligation, do the words that are now law remain under copyright? One issue here
is the copyrightability of law; a secondary issue would be whether, if enactment of ele-
ments of a standard as law converts them, in effect, into public property that is a taking
requiring just compensation.
The U.S. Copyright Office states forthrightly that “[e]dicts of government, such as
judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and
a foundry, may be subject to as many as 1000 standards. The ASTM foundry safety standard
alone cross references 35 other consensus standards and that is just the tip of the iceberg . . . .”);
accord Comment from David J. Osiecki, Senior Vice President, Policy & Regulatory Affairs,
Am. Trucking Ass’n, NARA-12-0002-0152, at 4 (June 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov
/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0152; Comment from Jess McCluer, Director of Safety
and Regulatory Affairs, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n, NARA-12-0002-0153, at 2 (June 1, 2012),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0153; Comment from James
J. Johnston, President, Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc., NARA-12-0002-0156,
at 7 (June 4, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0156.
The burden is that much greater when one considers the desirability of purchase at the proposal
stage. See Comment from John L. Conley, President, Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, NARA-12-
0002-0145, at 2 (June 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12
-0002-0145 (“One of the most challenging aspects . . . was that as published in the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, any party wishing to comment on the petition would first have
to purchase the publications in order to determine what changes would be made to existing
regulations and to determine the impact of the proposal.”). The other challenge is the arguable
need to purchase not only the standard that has been incorporated, but its subsequent revisions.
See Comment from Jerry Call, supra.
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similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy.”91
The proposition that public law is not subject to copyright first emerged in American
law (before the age of statutes or the Internet) in conflicts over the reporting of judicial
opinions. For example, in Wheaton v. Peters: “[T]he court are unanimously of opinion,
that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this
court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”92 Also,
in Banks v. Manchester:
[T]here has always been a judicial consensus . . . that no copyright
could under the statutes passed by Congress, be secured in the prod-
ucts of the labor done by judicial officers in the discharge of their
judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges constitutes the
authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding
every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a decla-
ration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or
a statute.93
Nash, the cited case, grew from the first days of national law publishing houses—Little,
Brown, and Company; West Publishing; and Lawyers’ Cooperative Publishing.94
Beyond its emphatic reaffirmation of “the public and common right to examine and pro-
cure copies of the opinions of the justices,”95 Nash laid the groundwork for a distinction
commonly observed: That although documents constituting the law itself are not subject
to copyright, still copyright protection can be obtained for compendia that include these
documents, along with other elements that are not, as such, the public’s property. And
thus, West’s headnotes secure sale of its reporters (as, today, Lexis’s capacity to charge
for access to its resources).
In addition to the general proposition of “law . . . free for publication to all,”96 cases
arising from the judicial opinions, rendered well before federal agency incorporation
by reference of SDO standards began, relied on the fact that because judges were sala-
ried public servants paid by the public for their work, judges could properly claim no
property in its output. The authors of legislation and regulatory outputs, too, have al-
ready been paid for their work. On the other hand, some argue, since SDOs’ only com-
pensation for intellectual output comes from some combination of membership fees and
copyright revenues, giving mandatory status to their standards through incorporation
by reference does not carry the same implication.97
91 COMPENDIUM II, supra note 63.
92 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834).
93 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253–54 (1888) (citing Nash v. Lothrop, 142 Mass.
29, 35 (1886)).
94 Nash, 142 Mass. at 30–31.
95 Id. at 38.
96 Banks, 128 U.S. at 253.
97 See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791, 816–17 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (Wiener, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
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These arguments, however, do not distinguish between the indisputably retained
right to publish one’s own intellectual work product98 and the right to publish, precisely
and only to that extent, such elements of those texts as have been converted into legally
binding obligations.99 Nor have they distinguished between the elements of value created
by a contemporary voluntary consensus standard, as such, and the additional value that
inheres in its having been converted into a legal obligation. As in the case of Herbs of
Commerce,100 the market for a standard will persist even after the standard has been
modified or displaced by its sponsoring SDO as a voluntary consensus standard, if the
governing law incorporating the earlier version of the standard has not changed. But
now the price for the standard is a price for law, plain and simple. First editions of other
law-bearing works, treatises or casebooks for example, go off the new-goods market
once second editions appear; certainly (save possibly for collectibles) their value is
much less. But this is not reflected in SDO pricing of displaced voluntary standards; if
they are still law, their value as law may even exceed the market value they had as just
voluntary consensus standards.101
As Professor Lawrence Cunningham suggested in a thoughtful analysis of account-
ing standards,102 it can be useful to address the copyrightability issue in terms of a
typology.103 Some standards may be created precisely in the expectation that they will
be adopted as law—on analogy, say, to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which
was drafted by private and quasi-governmental bodies—the American Law Insti-
tute (ALI) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL)104—directly for consideration and use by law-makers.105 Other copyrighted
works may be referenced in legal obligations but themselves play no part in law as
such—a novel listed as a required element of English classes for public school tenth
graders or a publication placing values on used cars that state law anoints as valid in
state tort actions.106 In between these poles lie most voluntary consensus standards that
have been converted into legal obligations through incorporation by reference; they may
not have been created in the expectation or hope that they would be used in this way,
but their incorporation converts their terms into the very stuff of legal obligation. A
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); see also Veeck, 293 F.3d at 794, 802.
99 See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 802–03.
100 See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
101 See id.
102 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2005) (providing a framework
for analyzing copyright to standards and proposing implementation mechanisms).
103 Id. at 297–98, 301.
104 See U.C.C. at 11 (2011); Cunningham, supra note 102, at 332 n.212; Alan Schwartz
& Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595,
596 (1995).
105 See Cunningham, supra note 102, at 332 & n.212.
106 See, e.g., id. at 298, 334–35.
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dietary supplement is lawful only if its ingredient list conforms to the nomenclature to
be found in the AHPA’s incorporated first edition of Herbs of Commerce.107
When standards are written explicitly in the contemplation of their use as law, they
may themselves be copyright eligible; an extension of copyright protection to the form
in which they are in fact made law, however, would be troublesome. Private develop-
ment of the Uniform Commercial Code by the ALI and NCCUSL greatly facilitated
state-by-state legislative adoptions that produced an essentially uniform national law
of commerce.108 The UCC itself is copyrighted,109 as are materials reflecting the history
of its drafting, and accompanying commentary;110 but when Minnesota adopted its terms
as Minnesota law111—publishing the adopted text, as amended perhaps, in its statutory
collections—any claim that Minnesotans must pay the ALI or NCCUSL to see the text
their state had enacted would convert the law into private property.112 If the standard has
been designed to become law, the claim of the public to know it is strong, and the SDO
is more likely to be disappointed if its work is not converted into legal obligations than
surprised if it is. So too, it would seem to follow, for the SBCCI model housing code.113
That code would itself be copyrighted, giving the SBCCI the exclusive right to sell it as
such, in a compilation that might include any accompanying commentary. But if a
Texas town accepted the implicit invitation to convert its terms, perhaps changed in
a few particulars, into the set of local ordinances governing home construction in its
jurisdiction, might not those ordinances be published as the law of that town, without
violating the SBCCI’s copyright?
This was the question presented in Veeck v. SBCCI,114 a judgment of the Fifth
Circuit sitting en banc that is the strongest recent voicing of the principle that law is
not subject to copyright. While the SBCCI had a valid copyright in its model code, con-
ferring on it exclusive rights to sell that code as such, what the Fifth Circuit held it could
not prevent was the publication online of what had been adopted as the law of the juris-
diction that adopted it: “‘[T]he law,’ whether articulated in judicial opinions or legisla-
tive acts or ordinances, is in the public domain and thus not amenable to copyright.”115
107 See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
108 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 104, at 596.
109 See U.C.C., at ii (2011).
110 Id. at ii–iii.
111 2004 Minn. Laws 101.
112 Whether the ALI and/or NCCUSL could demand payment from Minnesota for its
“taking” of their property is a formal question, and takings issues are to some extent considered
within. The very nature of their enterprise, however, suggests its answer.
113 In 2003, the SBCCI and other code-writing bodies merged into the ICC. The ICC’s 2012
International Residential Code for One- and Two-Family Dwellings is available for purchase.
See Store, ICC, http://shop.iccsafe.org/2012-international-residential-code-for-one-and-two
-family-dwellings.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
114 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
115 Id. at 796 (citing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888)).
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The court rejected the proposition that this idea depended on the salaries paid to public
authors of opinions, laws, and regulations.116 “[T]he ‘authorship’ question ignores the
democratic process . . . . In performing their function [by choosing a voluntary consen-
sus standard], the lawmakers represent the public will, and the public are the final
‘authors’ of the law.”117 Yet, the Veeck court reasoned, the SBCCI’s copyright in its
model code was indisputable, and no one could print it, as such, without a license from
the SBCCI.118 What governed the case was that Veeck had copied only “the law” of
two Texas towns.119 “The basic proposition was stated by [the first] Justice Harlan, writ-
ing for the Sixth Circuit: ‘any person desiring to publish the statutes of a state may use
any copy of such statutes to be found in any printed book.’. . .”120
The “model code” character of the SBCCI’s work carries with it considerations one
might think particularly supportive of a denial of copyright protection for whole sets of
standards that, as in Veeck, are converted into law by some particular jurisdiction. First,
code developers who seek incorporation, like the ALI and NCCUSL or the developers
of model building codes, face no difficulty in preserving the market value of their prod-
uct. It may include explanatory materials, examples, and other matter that will not be
enacted; it will be presented in a format that is relatively cheap to buy and easy to carry
about for reference. For such a document, rather than destroying a market, a requirement
that what has been enacted must be public could be expected to enhance the value of
the SDO’s product, enlarging if not in fact creating the market for it. Incorporation
would also confer satisfying prestige on the SDO (likely a substantial motivation
for creation in the first place), adding to the value of its other works. These offsetting
benefits make it unlikely that incorporation will have diminished the value of the
SDO’s property.121
Second, the motivation specifically to create a work to be given the force of law
suggests that recognizing copyright protection carries considerable risks of exploitation
not of the intellectual merits of the work, as such, but of the necessities created by its
status as law. If it did not anticipate sufficient reward from the satisfaction and prestige
accompanying having the merits of its work thus recognized, or from the possibilities
incorporation would open up of commercial exploitation of supplementary—but non-
essential—instructive or explanatory materials, an SDO could require an adopting
jurisdiction to pay it up front for its efforts—that is, it could contract for the work of
producing it.
116 Id. at 796–97.
117 Id. at 799.
118 Id. at 794.
119 Id. at 794, 800 n.14.
120 Id. at 800 (quoting Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898)).
121 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 63,
at § 2.53 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine an area of creative endeavor in which the copyright incen-
tive is needed less [than for standards generation].”).
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Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Association,122
extensively discussed in Veeck,123 seems at first to be in tension with it but rather, as
Veeck recognizes, reflects this economic reality.124 The American Medical Association
(AMA) had developed and copyrighted a comprehensive coding system for physicians
to use in identifying their services and medical procedures.125 In return for a promise to
use no other system, it granted the Federal Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) a “non-exclusive, royalty-free and irrevocable license.”126 This license was free
of any restrictions on the government’s right to reproduce or distribute the codes, but
reserved copyright in relation to possible private competitors.127 The HCFA then devel-
oped the Health Care Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) as a mandatory
common procedure coding system for physicians’ use on Medicare and Medicaid
claims;128 it included both the copyrighted the AMA Code and additional codes the
HCFA had itself developed.129 After the AMA denied Practice Management Information
(PMI) a volume discount for purchase of its code—that is, not the HCPCS—PMI
sought a declaratory judgment that the AMA’s copyright was invalid, intending to pub-
lish the AMA code in an alternative, perhaps cheaper form than the AMA itself sold.130
While the court rejected that claim, adopting the limited judges-are-paid-for-their-work
understanding of the earlier Supreme Court cases,131 it had no occasion to rule on PMI’s
right to publish the federal standard as such—that is, the HCPCS including its non-
AMA codes. Just as Veeck could not properly have published the SBCCI model build-
ing code as such—but was within his rights publishing the uncopyrightable building
codes of two Texas towns132—PMI could not publish, as such, the copyrighted the
AMA coding system.133 In the end, in fact, PMI prevailed, on the ground that in ex-
tracting the HCFA’s promise to use no other coding system, the AMA had abused
its copyright.134
122 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
123 293 F.3d 791, 796–97 & n.7 (2002).
124 Id. at 805.
125 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp., 121 F.3d at 517.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 517–21.
128 Id. at 517–18.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 518 (citing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888)).
131 Id.
132 Veeck v. SBCCI, 293 F.3d 791, 794, 800 n.14 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
133 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp., 121 F.3d at 520. Consider, in this respect, the Delaware
State Fire Prevention Commission’s recent adoption of the 2011 National Electric Code as law
for Delaware, but with two amendments it itself made, and permission granted to localities to
adopt improving (and not inconsistent) amendments. See Implementation of the National
Electrical Code, NEMA, http://www.nema.org/Technical/FieldReps/Documents/Combined
-NEC-Adoption-Report-No-IRC.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
134 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp., 121 F.3d at 521.
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Another case discussed and distinguished in Veeck is CCC Information Services v.
Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.,135 which falls at Professor Cunningham’s other
pole136—both because the alleged copyright violator had sought to republish the copy-
righted work as such, and because the law’s reference to that work had not had the effect
of converting it itself into a legal obligation.137 A New York statute required insurance
companies to include “The Red Book” as one of several privately prepared and copy-
righted lists of projected automobile values when they were determining payments for
the loss of a vehicle.138 CCC Information Services simply appropriated parts of The Red
Book for its customers.139 Unprepared “to hold that a state’s reference to a copyrighted
work as a legal standard for valuation results in loss of the copyright,”140 the Second
Circuit equated CCC’s claim with the proposition that novels would lose copyright once
assigned as part of a mandatory school curriculum.141 The Veeck court wrote:
If a statute refers to the Red Book or to specific school books, the
law requires citizens to consult or use a copyrighted work in the
process of fulfilling their obligations. The copyrighted works do
not “become law” merely because a statute refers to them. See
1 GOLDSTEIN COPYRIGHT, § 2.49 at n. 45.2 (noting that CCC
and Practice Management “involved compilations of data that had
received governmental approval, not content that had been enacted
into positive law”). Equally important, the referenced works or
standards in CCC and Practice Management were created by pri-
vate groups for reasons other than incorporation into law. To the
extent incentives are relevant to the existence of copyright protec-
tion, the authors in these cases deserve incentives. And neither
CCC nor AMA solicited incorporation of their standards by legis-
lators or regulators. In the case of a model code, on the other hand,
the text of the model serves no other purpose than to become law.
SBCCI operates with the sole motive and purpose of creating codes
that will become obligatory in law.142
Neither Veeck nor cases like CCC Information Services directly control the setting
in which a voluntary consensus standard has, through incorporation by reference, be-
come law, itself binding on citizens. On the one hand, it is law in the strong sense that
135 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995).
136 See Cunningham, supra note 102, at 334.
137 See id.
138 CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 63–64.
139 Id. at 64.
140 Id. at 74.
141 Id.
142 Veeck v. SBCCI, 293 F.3d 791, 804–05 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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underlies the belief that citizens are entitled unconstrained access to the standards that
govern their conduct at risk of possible penalty for violation. On the other, the authors
of voluntary consensus standards generated to that end—that is, not for the “motive and
purpose of creating codes that will become obligatory in law”143—deserve incentives
to support their socially valuable conduct. On the one hand, the creation of a voluntary
consensus standard can be valued by a market; it may be in competition with other stan-
dards bearing on similar issues, and the price it can command may be a function of its
intrinsic worth to its purchasers. On the other hand, if it is converted into a legal obliga-
tion, not only may the price it can command be artificially inflated by that fact, as in
the case of the first edition of the AHPA’s Herbs of Commerce,144 but the public’s stake
in knowing what standard has been proposed and on what basis, and having the chance
to participate in its consideration, is greatly heightened. This is Professor Cunningham’s
difficult middle ground.145
Are there means, then, to avoid undermining the financial viability of SDOs, as they
fear simple rejection of copyright in their incorporated standards would do, while facili-
tating citizen access to binding legal obligations and controlling against the possibility
of monopoly pricing of law? Before turning to this ultimate question, it will be useful
to set forth the current statutory and regulatory regimes affecting incorporation by refer-
ence and proposals that have been made for altering them.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
A. The Office of the Federal Register
As earlier shown,146 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) specifically authorizes incorporation by
reference of materials that the Director of the Office of the Federal Register (OFR)
finds to be “reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby.”147 When
§ 552(a)(1) was enacted in its present form, the Federal Register and the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), like statutes, were available only as print documents.148 Per-
mitting the incorporation by reference in them of bulky, numerous standards protected
their size, and it was primarily for that reason that incorporation by reference of material
143 Id. at 805.
144 See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
145 See Cunningham, supra note 102, at 335–38.
146 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
147 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006).
148 Section 552 was enacted in 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-409. See id. § 552(b). The first elec-
tronic version of the Federal Register was published June 8, 1994, and on September 19, 1996,
the online version of the Federal Register and its companion publications became official
editions. NARA, THE FEDERAL REGISTER MARCH 14, 1936–MARCH 14, 2006, at 15 (Mar. 14,
2006), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/history.pdf.
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that might state binding legal obligations was permitted. Section 552(a) requires the
Director to determine for each standard he approves for incorporation by reference, case
by case, that it is “reasonably available.”149 Congress would have had reason to believe
that, by virtue of office, the Director would be institutionally committed to public aware-
ness of law. And those supporting the measure acknowledged the public’s need to know
the law.150 Its legislative history seems to have assumed that the incorporated material
would not be copyrighted; but that the texts of standards made law by incorporation
would be published by commercial law publishers operating in the competitive market
for their services—West, CCH, Prentice Hall.151 The texts just would not be published
in the Federal Register or the CFR.152 Given these expectations, Congress’s members
could have believed the law would be widely available in law libraries open to public
use; providing for “reasonable availability”153 thus entailed neither the need personally
to pay for access to the law nor, especially, the risk of monopoly pricing.
The OFR adopted its regulations governing incorporation by reference that are in
effect at this writing, Part 51 of Title 1 of the CFR, in 1982, before the Information
Age.154 Whatever the enacting Congress might have expected, the text and administra-
tion of these regulations revealed a remarkable indifference to actual public knowledge
of the law. Under them, agencies need not inform the OFR of their intention to incorpo-
rate a given standard as a legal obligation until twenty working days before its submis-
sion for publication in the Federal Register as a final rule.155 Thus, Part 51 paid no
attention to providing the interested public an opportunity for comment—that is, to a
standard’s public availability, reasonable or not, at the time when it is proposed to be
incorporated in a regulation. Imagine that the PHMSA (or for that matter the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission) were to propose a rule to deal with the problem of possible
corrosion in pipes, and that its proposal said only that it proposed to incorporate by
reference “A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining Strength of Corroded
Pipe,” a standard developed by the Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI).156
149 § 552(a)(1).
150 See S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 5 (1964).
151 Thus, Senate Report 1219 anticipated ready availability in terms of material “publicized
in professional or specialized services, such as Commerce Clearing House, West publications,
etc.” Id.
152 Id. at 4–5.
153 § 552(a)(1).
154 See 1 C.F.R. § 51 (2013). As this Article enters final editing, the Office has just published
a notice of proposed rulemaking to effect some changes, extensively discussed in the following
pages. Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-02/pdf/2013-24217.pdf. The comment period for the proposal,
when last seen, permitted comments to be filed until January 31, 2014, and it appears likely new
regulations will then be published. Id.
155 § 51.5(a)(1).
156 PRCI Publications Document Details, PRCI, http://prci.org/index.php/pmlpubs_local
details/?docid=346 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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The PRCI is “a community of the world’s leading pipeline companies,”157 and sells this
standard for $995.158 One wishing to comment on this proposal, a matter of considerable
interest to anyone who might be affected by pipe failure—not only pipeline companies,
as recent catastrophes have amply demonstrated159—would be obliged to make this
purchase if she wished to understand the proposal on which she had been invited to
comment.160 If she were able to view the proposed standard, moreover, it is highly un-
certain she would have access to the data, studies, and discussions on which it had
been based.
Having to purchase access to the proposal and the likely unavailability of its
supporting materials has conflicted sharply with both the contemporary law of rule-
making and the developments that have made access to supporting data costless and
immediate for all, once material is placed online. How can one comment persuasively
on a standard whose content and underlying basis are unknown? Judge Harold
Leventhal persuasively asked that question four decades ago,161 and ever since then,
judges have understood the statutory requirement to publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register also to require agencies simultaneously to release
important materials on which the proposal relies.162 This understanding is at some
tension, to be sure, with a statute worded in very general terms,163 but it has won
157 Welcome, PRCI, http://prci.org/index.php/about/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (welcome
by President Cliff Johnson).
158 PRCI Publications Document Details, supra note 156.
159 See Andrew W. Lehren, Millions of Miles of Pipe, and Years of Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2010, at A1; Associated Press, Corrosion in Pipe May Have Caused Fire, WASH.
POST, Aug. 12, 2012, at A4.
160 As another example, consider the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)’s implementation of the Pipeline Safety Improve-
ment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, § 5, 116 Stat. 2985, 2988–89 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 60116 (2006)), which charged it to issue standards for public education about pipeline
hazards. For this task, hardly an NTTAA “performance-based or design-specific technical
specification[ ],” Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775, 783 (1996), the PHMSA turned to the
American Petroleum Institute (API), which produced a fifty-plus-page standard which the
PHMSA proposed to incorporate by reference. PUBLIC AWARENESS PROGRAMS FOR PIPELINE
OPERATORS: API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 1162 (2003), available at http://www.api.org
/publications-standards-and-statistics/government-cited-safety-documents. The PHMSA then
did incorporate the API’s standard by reference, after a public rulemaking process that was
devoid of access to the proposed standard or its supporting materials. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
161 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921 (1974) (“It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to pro-
mulgate rules on the basis of . . . data that, critical degree, is known only to the agency.”).
162 Id. at 394.
163 As the U.S. Code describes the substance of the required notice, it is to include “either
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006). Judge Leventhal’s extension of this to scientific data and reports
in Portland Cement is perhaps best understood as a response to the changes worked by the 1964
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near-universal acceptance.164 Executive Order 12,866,165 which since 1993 has consti-
tuted the President’s instructions to agencies for their conduct of the more important
rulemakings, embodies both this obligation and an obligation (also hard to connect with
statutory language) actually to provide a draft of the proposed regulation, by which
means a proposal to incorporate by reference can be seen.166 In the Computer Age, a
Federal Data Management Service (FDMS) provides the site on which all this material
is to be posted, readily searchable by any interested member of the public.167
As currently constituted, Part 51’s controls do operate at the point of final rule-
making,168 but they have been slight. To accompany its request for permission to incor-
porate standards by reference, the agency must provide the OFR with one physical copy
of the material to be incorporated;169 that copy is then stored in the National Archives
where the public might find it.170 The agency must persuade the OFR that the material
to be incorporated is “usable” (a manageable print file),171 a “requirement,”172 and “sub-
stantially reduces the volume of material published in the FEDERAL REGISTER”;173 and
Freedom of Information Act under which such information would almost inevitably have to be
supplied in response to a request. See § 552; see also Peter L. Strauss, Statutes That Are Not
Static: The Case of the APA, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 767 (2005).
164 See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It
would appear to be a fairly obvious proposition that studies upon which an agency relies in pro-
mulgating a rule must be made available during the rulemaking in order to afford interested per-
sons meaningful notice and an opportunity to comment.”). But see id. at 246 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Portland Cement doctrine cannot be squared
with the text of § 553 of the APA.”); Comment from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, SBA, OMB-2012-0003-0066, at 7 (June 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#
!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003-0066 (“Data and analysis that support a private technical
standard used by a Federal agency should be held to the same standard [of quality, objectivity,
utility and integrity] . . . . If an agency is unable to provide reasonable access to the data and
analysis or unable to resolve significant Information Quality challenges to a standard, it should
not use that standard.”).
165 Exec. Order No. 12,866—Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(Oct. 4, 1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). E.O. 12,866 has been amended
by President Obama. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009).
166 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in
5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (“For each matter . . . , the issuing agency shall provide to OIRA: (i) the
text of the draft regulatory action . . . .”); id. § 6(a)(3)(E) (“After the regulatory action has been
published in the Federal Register or otherwise issued to the public, the agency shall: (i) Make
available to the public the information set forth in subsections (a)(3)(B) and (C) . . . .”).
167 FDMS, http://www.fdms.gov (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
168 1 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)(1) (2013).
169 § 51.5(a)(2).
170 See Research Our Records, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/research/ (last
visited Dec. 12, 2013).
171 § 51.7(a)(4).
172 § 51.9(b)(3).
173 § 51.7(a)(3).
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the agency must state in the regulation’s language of incorporation “where and how cop-
ies may be examined and readily obtained with maximum convenience to the user.”174
In practice, however, “maximum convenience to the user”175 is satisfied by the presence
of one physical copy of the standard in the NARA archives, and another in the incorpo-
rating agency’s Washington, D.C.–area reading room.176 That the incorporated material
must be a “requirement,” not an element of the statute,177 entails that the material once
successfully incorporated will impose legal obligations. Otherwise undefined in the reg-
ulation, the OFR’s attention to “reasonably available” in Part 51 has involved no con-
sideration whatever of the price the standard’s owner may be charging for access to it,
now or in future years, or the conditions being placed on that access.178
Neither has the OFR’s regime given any assurance about the continued availability
of the incorporated standard, other than through the two printed copies in storage at
different locations in or near Washington, D.C., which might in practice become quite
difficult to access. Doubtless, responding to concerns about delegation of lawmaking
authority to private bodies, the OFR regulation is emphatic that incorporation “is limited
to the edition of the publication that is approved [that is, to the edition that the agency
has itself identified and decided to make legally obligatory]. Future amendments or revi-
sions of the publication are not included.”179 Because revising an incorporated standard
174 § 51.9(b)(4).
175 Id.
176 See, e.g., supra note 79.
177 The greater part of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) requires Federal Register publication of material
(e.g., “descriptions of its central and field organization”) that does not qualify as a “require-
ment.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006). Even subsection (D) requires publication not only of
“substantive rules of general applicability,” but also of “statements of general policy or inter-
pretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency”—i.e., soft, not hard,
law. § 552(a)(1)(D). It does not appear from the pages of the Federal Register that these obliga-
tions have been rigorously enforced—understandable enough from the perspective of protecting
its volume—and in any event in the age of the Internet the right place for these documents is not
on the pages of one day’s printed and imperfectly indexed Federal Register, but on agency
websites where later statutes require them to be maintained and Boolean searches are gener-
ally available.
178 1 C.F.R. § 51.1(a) (2013).
179 § 51.1(f). State courts have rejected regulations giving legal force to future versions of
standards as improper delegations of public authority into private hands. See, e.g., Blitch v. City
of Ocala, 195 So. 406, 408 (Fla. 1940) (holding that a municipal ordinance, requiring roofing
shingles corresponding to National Board of Fire Underwriters standards, would be invalid if
it included future changes); Brookhaven Baymen’s Ass’n v. Town of Southampton, 926
N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (invalidating a law that gave a private Board of
Trustees the ability to change shellfish regulations in the future); Hillman v. N. Wasco Cnty.
People’s Util. Dist., 323 P.2d 664, 672–73 (Or. 1958), overruled by Maulding v. Clackamas
Cnty., 563 P.2d 731 (Or. 1977) (finding unconstitutional the adoption of the national electrical
code that changes from time to time); City of Chamberlain v. R.E. Lien, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 130,
133 (S.D. 1994) (invalidating law that delegates to the American Institute of Architects the au-
thority to require public contracts include provisions from an AIA standardized form). It seems
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would require a fresh round of notice-and-comment rulemaking, adopted standards often
remain law long after the organizations that initially drafted them have updated them—
as in the case of the AHPA standards discussed above.180
Thus, although creating legal obligations through incorporation by reference has
saved agency resources at the initial stage of incorporation, it has done so at the cost
of making change expensive. The result, as already noted, is that although ANSI’s
“Essential Requirements”181 require standards organizations revisit their standards
every few years, to keep them current; but the majority of standards incorporated into
federal regulations were incorporated before 1996.182 Comments in the FDMS dockets
of two recent inquiries into incorporation by reference issues identify numerous incor-
porated standards, still law, that are unavailable183 or have subsequently been revealed
to be inadequate or even dangerous.184
The arrival of the Internet and the creation of agency electronic reading rooms have
both eliminated the space-saving rationale for incorporation by reference and created
new obligations of government transparency. Both developments have called into par-
ticular question the financial side-effect of incorporation by reference, that people might
be made to pay private organizations to obtain access to the standards governing their
conduct. The electronic reading rooms have no real limits on size; they can readily hy-
perlink to documents maintained on other web sites; and standard search engines permit
rapidly focusing on materials of interest. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act of
1996,185 in requiring the creation of electronic reading rooms,186 brought to light and
ready public access the enormous range of agency materials other than regulations that
might influence their regulatory conduct. Now the effect of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) was
to oblige agencies to make all their guidance materials that did not have to be published
a different question, though, whether an incorporation by reference is permissible only if it is
a requirement—that is, only if it carries mandatory force. See § 51.9(b)(3).
Since the 1970s, the Federal Register has refused to provide copyright
protection to private standards unless the agency incorporates them into
a formal rule in the CFR . . . [which] greatly complicates the most minor
revision . . . . [T]he inability to accommodate frequent change is a partic-
ular obstacle to broader implementation of conformity assessment and
complex technology standards.
Comment from Scott Rafferty, OMB-2012-0003-0049, at 4–5 (May 8, 2012), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003-0049 [hereinafter Rafferty, OMB
Comment]; see also Comment from Scott Rafferty, NARA-12-0002-0118 (May 25, 2012),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0118.
180 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
181 See supra ANSI Essential Requirements, note 20.
182 See infra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
183 Id.
184 See infra notes 247, 256.
185 Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048
(1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
186 Id. § 4.
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in the Federal Register available in their electronic reading rooms, if the agencies
wished them to have any impact on private conduct.187 Strikingly, the qualities of guid-
ance documents are just those generally associated with voluntary consensus standards.
They identify means for achieving a certain result, such as one that regulations may
require, without in themselves limiting the possibility of achieving that result by other
means. The E-Government Act of 2002 carried this transparency impulse one step
further.188 It not only requires the migration of rulemaking activities to the more accessi-
ble and transparent web, but also makes clear that the electronic docket it mandates for
all rulemaking is to be comprehensive, containing all materials relevant to the rule-
making process.189 In consequence of these developments, today only SDO copyright
claims obstruct ready public access to rulemaking proposals and to resulting legal obli-
gations. The strong general impulse of federal law is to require transparency of measures
that will affect public obligations.
B. Copyright Preservation as Affirmative Federal Policy? Congress, the NTTAA,
the NIST, and the OMB
Perhaps the strongest case to be made for the current state of affairs is that in recent
years Congress has consistently relied on voluntary consensus standards as a preferred
source of regulatory standards. When in 1970 it created OSHA, Congress instructed
OSHA to adopt consensual work-place safety standards in the absence of a showing of
their inadequacy,190 as a means to quickly establish a floor of enforceable legal obliga-
tion unlikely to prove controversial to industry (though perhaps less than optimal from
187 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for
public inspection and copying . . .
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register;
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect
a member of the public . . . .
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual
or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used,
or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency
only if—
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as pro-
vided by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006). It is perhaps noteworthy that this section permits excision of materials
only “to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and makes no provision
for incorporation by reference. Id. § 552(a)(2).
188 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
189 Id. § 206(d).
190 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2006).
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a labor perspective).191 When the Consumer Product Safety Commission was established
in 1972, it was similarly instructed.192 Then in 1995, building on an OMB Circular
(A-119), first issued in the Reagan Administration,193 the NTTAA generalized the
proposition, requiring a preference for both the use of voluntary consensus standards
rather than self-generated rules and agency participation, where permitted, in their
generation.194 The statute rested on the perceptions that these standards embody greater
technical expertise than the government is generally able to assemble; result from more
efficient processes, are more acceptable—if consensual—to the industry involved than
government imposition of mandatory standards would be; and are generated without sig-
nificant cost to the public.195 Its administration was assigned to the National Institute of
Standards and Measures (NIST), an agency Congress established in 1988 in the Depart-
ment of Commerce to take over the responsibilities previously held by its National
Bureau of Standards.196
None of these statutes address the copyright question, and the absence of attention
is perhaps especially striking in the NTTAA, which is primarily concerned with the
treatment, including the financial treatment, of patents that result from shared govern-
ment and private technology development.197 The OMB’s Circular A-119, which in its
most recent revision to date (1998) is an implementation of the NTTAA,198 does state
that “[i]f a voluntary standard is used and published in an agency document, your
agency must observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder and any other similar
obligations,”199 and copyright protection was clearly a matter of concern to those
who had participated in the notice-and-comment process leading to the Circular’s
191 Id.
192 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (2006). This history, and much else of value in understanding the
history and sweep of standards development, may be found in HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 93–97 (2005).
193 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-390, at 25 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 493, 511
(“OMB Circular A-119 was originally promulgated in 1982 and revised in 1993. It requires fed-
eral agencies to adopt and use standards, developed by voluntary consensus standards bodies,
and to work closely with these organizations to ensure that developed standards are consistent
with agency needs.”).
194 See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
§ 3(d)(2), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (1996).
195 H.R. REP. NO. 104-390, pt. III (1995).
196 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5111–5115,
102 Stat. 1107, 1427–33 (1988).
197 See generally National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775 (1996).
198 As of October 4, 2013, OIRA had not yet undertaken the revision suggested by its notice
in the spring of 2012. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. It was, however, expected
“any day now.” Conversation with Emily Schleicher Bremer, Attorney Advisor, ACUS
(Oct. 2, 2013).
199 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).
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promulgation.200 Yet the discussion studiously avoids discussing just what those rights
might be, and, of particular interest in this regard is a comment apparently limiting its
intended scope to other than regulatory requirements:
35. A few commentators inquired whether the Circular applies to
“regulatory standards.” In response, the final Circular distinguishes
between a “technical standard,” which may be referenced in a regu-
lation, and a “regulatory standard,” which establishes overall regu-
latory goals or outcomes. The Act and the Circular apply to the
former, but not to the latter. As described in the legislative history,
technical standards pertain to “products and processes, such as the
size, strength, or technical performance of a product, process or
material” and as such may be incorporated into a regulation. [See
142 Cong. Rec. S1080 (daily ed. February 7, 1996) (Statement of
Sen. Rockefeller.)] Neither the Act nor the Circular require any
agency to use private sector standards which would set regulatory
standards or requirements.201
If the NTTAA and the Circular, then, do not apply to “regulatory . . . requirements,”202
it would appear that they do not apply to incorporations that set legal obligations, as
distinct from incorporations establishing permitted means by which legal obligations
may be met. Preserving copyright for the latter sort of incorporation, if the OFR permit-
ted it—as it will be argued below they should203—would neither challenge the proposi-
tion that law is not subject to copyright, nor appear to confer on private parties the
power to place a monopoly price on access to knowledge of one’s legal obligations.
The strength of federal law in encouraging coordination between SDOs and national
regulators is reflected as well in congressional limitations of the possibility of antitrust
enforcement against SDOs, even when, as has happened, standard-setting is used by
200 Id. at 8548, 8550.
201 Id. at 8549. In offering the amendment that was adopted as § 12(d) of the NTTAA,
Senator Rockefeller remarked that the NTTAA was limited to “standards pertaining to products
and processes, such as the size, strength, or technical performance of a product, process, or
material,” differentiating those standards from “private sector attempts to set regulatory stan-
dards or requirements. For example, we do not intend for the Government to have to follow any
attempts by private standard bodies to set specific environmental regulations.” 142 CONG. REC.
S1077 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1996) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). The earliest Administrative
Conference attention to voluntary consensus standards, in 1978, recognized as well the pref-
erability of standards “which specify nomenclature, basic reference units, or methods of
measurement or testing, and which are primarily empirical in their formulation.” ACUS
Recommendation 78-4: Federal Agency Interaction with Private Standard Setting Organizations
in Health and Safety Regulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 1357, 1358 (Jan. 5, 1979) [hereinafter Recom-
mendation 78-4(6)].
202 See OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).
203 See infra Part III.D.
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active participants in their processes to gain commercial advantage over competitors.204
The market’s awareness that one boiler does, and another does not, satisfy an AMSE
safety standard can drive the maker of the latter out of business—and the maker of the
first may be able to secure that determination by its position in the standards develop-
ment organization.205 So, too, if the makers of steel conduits for electric wiring are able
to exclude polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conduit as an approved type of electrical conduit
in the National Electrical Code,206 or if the manufacturer of new tanks for containing
hazardous materials is able to cause disapproval of a new technology that, by facilitating
repair of leaky tanks already in place, would cut into its market.207 The anti-competitive
impact would be all the stronger, should the standards in question have been converted
into legal obligations through incorporation by reference. Although one might suppose
the antitrust laws offered control over such behaviors, a combination of Supreme Court
judgments208 and congressional actions209 has seriously weakened, if not eliminated,
204 Professor Christopher L. Sagers has extensively considered the antitrust issues in a series
of law review articles. See Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting
Organizations: A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393,
1398–1402 (2004); Christopher L. Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37
(2007); Christopher L. Sagers, Standardization and Markets: Just Exactly Who Is the Govern-
ment, and Why Should Antitrust Care?, 89 OR. L. REV. 785, 798–800 (2011) [hereinafter
Sagers, Standardization and Markets]; see also Wolf, supra note 6, at 839; infra note 209.
205 See, e.g., ASME v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559–62 (1982).
206 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496–97 (1988) (noting
that polyvinyl chloride conduit was rejected only after steel interests “recruited 230 persons to
join the [National Fire Protection] Association and to attend the annual meeting to vote against
the proposal”). The National Electric Code is a set of standards created under the aegis of the
National Fire Protection Association, not itself law although its standards are often incorporated
by reference in local building codes. See generally PAUL ROSENBERG, GUIDE TO THE 2011
NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE (2011).
207 Sessions Tank Liners, Inc., v. Joor Mfg. Co., 17 F.3d 295, 296–98 (9th Cir. 1994) (de-
scribing approval of revision of Uniform Fire Code that rejected plaintiff company’s tank-lining
operation after defendant company’s president influenced subcommittee to reject the lining).
208 Thus, the antitrust immunity for outcomes characterized as the result of successful peti-
tioning of government for legal change, established by E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965), reversing 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), while somewhat modified in
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. 492, successfully defeated antitrust liability in Sessions Tank Liners,
Inc., 17 F.3d 295.
209 Reactions to FTC efforts to use antitrust laws to control SDO anti-competitive activity
include: the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 7,
94 Stat. 374, 376 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2006)) (providing
that “the Commission shall not develop or promulgate any trade rule or regulation with regard
to the regulation of the development and utilization of the standards and certification activ-
ities”); The Standards Development Organization Advancement (SDO) Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-237, § 103, 118 Stat. 661, 663 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(7)
(2006)) (significantly limiting the antitrust exposure of SDOs that engage only in “developing,
promulgating, revising, amending, reissuing, interpreting, or otherwise maintaining a voluntary
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that possibility. Yet, like the NTTAA and Circular A-119, what these measures address
are “voluntary consensus standards”210 creating “technical standards,”211 and not any
legal obligations—“regulatory standards or requirements”212—that might result from
the manner of their incorporation by reference.
In practice, agencies and SDOs have understood both the NTTAA and Circular
A-119 to preserve SDO copyrights past the point of incorporation.213 Circular A-119’s
instruction to “observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder”214 might have been
understood as an instruction to secure in advance an SDO’s permission to convert its
privately generated standard into a public legal obligation. One can imagine bargained
prices, or perhaps that this would constitute a taking that must be paid for. In either case,
one suspects that the resulting prestige and the possibility of competition amongst
standard-setters would keep prices down if not eliminate them.215 Instead, the call for
respecting copyright has been taken to permit keeping the law private and to let copy-
right holders charge those who must comply with their monopoly prices for knowledge
of it. The fear has been that rendering the standards-made-law public would undermine
the business model necessary to sustain the SDOs’ important work.216 This impulse has
only been strengthened as agency budgets have shrunk (alongside, correspondingly,
consensus standard, or using such standard in conformity assessment”). The latter Act strongly
expresses congressional approval of federal use of voluntary consensus standards, yet in doing
so makes explicit reference to the provisions of the NTTAA and OMB Circular A-119 that
appear to imagine their use as means to satisfy regulatory requirements rather than as the re-
quirements themselves. See OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).
210 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8554.
211 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 4(d)(4),
110 Stat. 783 (1996); see also Recommendation 78-4(6), supra note 201.
212 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8549.
213 See, e.g., infra Part III.B (discussing NAESB’s recently announced copyright practice).
214 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8555.
215 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 100–01.
216 James A. Thomas, A Business Model That Works, STANDARDIZATION NEWS, May/June
2010, available at http://www.astm.org/PRESIDENT/mj10_a_business_model_that_works
.html; Why Voluntary Consensus Standards Incorporated by Reference into Federal Govern-
ment Regulations Are Copyright Protected, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., at 3 (2011), avail-
able at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Critical
%20Issues/Copyright%20on%20Standards%20in%20Regulations/Copyright%20on%20Stan
dards%20in%20Regulation.pdf. Like other expressions of this fear, this argument does not
consider the possibility that read-only digital access to standards would not threaten the SDO
business model. At a recent conference, ANSI’s president announced its creation of a strongly
protected single source for free public access to incorporated standards, and James Shannon,
CEO of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)—source of the National Electric
Code, among others, and one of the country’s larger SDOs—recounted NFPA’s ten-year expe-
rience with such an approach, lacking significant adverse financial impact. Joseph Bhatia &
James Shannon, Government Reliance on Voluntary Consensus Standards and Conformance
Programs, Remarks at the ANSI World Standards Week 2013 Open Forum (Washington, D.C.,
Oct. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Bhatia & Shannon Remarks].
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agency capacity to self-generate regulations or, for that matter, effectively to oversee
private standard-setting). Little, if any, attention has been given to the impact of the
Internet, and the increasing expectations about the availability of government informa-
tion it has engendered, on the considerations at play. The effect, as has been widely
observed,217 has transferred wide swathes of law-making into private hands.
C. Possibilities of Change: An Administrative Conference Study, Rulemaking
Proposal, and Reconsideration of OMB Circular A-119
In December 2011, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
considered and adopted a number of thoughtful recommendations on incorporation
by reference practice,218 building on extensive analysis by staff members, notably
Emily Schleicher Bremer.219 These recommendations, however, addressed themselves
only to agency practice,220 and neither to the responsibilities of the Director nor to
the sufficiency of Part 51, in the Information Age, to govern the question of reason-
able availability.
For example, the ACUS Recommendations urged agencies to address incorporation
by reference issues at the stage of notice of proposed rulemaking.221 They called atten-
tion to the need for proposed incorporations to be available at the rulemaking proposal
stage, observing that the opportunity to comment on a proposal is illusory if one cannot
know what it is that is being proposed.222 They took approving notice of the practice of
some federal agencies, which negotiate free read-only access on standards organizations’
websites during comment periods to any standards that are proposed to be incorporated
217 See BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5; Cunningham, supra note 102; Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Nina Mendelson, Private
Control over Access to Public Law: The Puzzling Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards,
112 MICH. L. REV (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2264321; Pamela
Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2007); Katie M.
Colendich, Note, Who Owns “The Law”? The Effect on Copyrights When Privately-Authored
Works Are Adopted or Enacted by Reference into Law, 78 WASH. L. REV. 589 (2003).
218 See generally ACUS, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-5:
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE (Dec. 8, 2011) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION 2011-5], available at http://www.acus.gov/acus-recommendations/incor
poration-by-reference/.
219 Emily Schleicher Bremer, DRAFT FOR COMMITTEE REVIEW, INCORPORATION BY REFER-
ENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATIONS (Oct. 19, 2011), available at https://law.resource.org/pub/us
/cfr/recommendation.acus/Revised-Draft-IBR-Report-10-19-11.pdf (subsequently revised and
published at Incorporation by Reference in an Open Government Age, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 133 (2013)). Scott J. Rafferty, former Deputy General Counsel of ACUS, filed extensive
comments in the NARA and OMB dockets, taking somewhat variant positions more supportive
of the analysis offered in this article. See supra note 179.
220 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-5, supra note 218, at 5–10.
221 Id. at 6.
222 Id.
530 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:497
by reference, as a means of fortifying the comment process.223 But they suggested only
a preference for such measures, and did not recommend that the Director of the OFR
make their public availability during the comment period a requisite element of “reason-
ably available.”224 Similarly, while encouraging the use of standards that can be accessed
without the payment of a fee and acknowledging decisions supporting the proposition
that law is not subject to copyright, the recommendations accepted the possibility that
the public could still be required to pay copyright holders to learn the content of stan-
dards that by incorporation have been transformed into law governing their conduct.225
Their acceptance of this state of affairs was grounded in the long period of usage and
in readings of the legislation and presidential guidance that failed to note the differentia-
tion between “technical standards” and “regulatory standards or requirements.”226 No
consideration was given to the effect of continued copyright protection of what has be-
come law, after it has ceased to represent a contemporary voluntary consensus standard.
Thus, the ACUS Recommendations remained open to the possibility that, even when
the incorporation of standards by reference has converted them into legal obligations,
the “owner” of the standards might require the public to pay whatever license fees they
might choose to charge, for access to them under whatever conditions of use and/or dis-
tribution they might choose to impose, well past their continued relevance as “voluntary
consensus standards.”
This author, with twenty-three others, subsequently filed a petition for rulemaking
with the OFR urging it to revise Part 51 to reflect the changes brought about by the
Information Age and to impose two new conditions on incorporation by reference: first,
that any proposal must demonstrate that the standards had been made available without
charge on commenter request during the comment period for the proposed rule; and
second, that if and to the extent the proposed incorporation creates a legal obligation,
the text of that obligation too must be available without charge to any member of the
affected public.227 The first condition reflected ACUS’s advice to agencies to arrange
access during the comment period, that might be restricted to commenters and protected
223 Id. at 3.
224 Id. at 5.
225 The ACUS Recommendations do acknowledge that “[t]here is some ambiguity in current
law regarding the current scope of copyright protection for materials incorporated into regu-
lations, as well as the question of what uses of such materials might constitute ‘fair use’ under
section 107 of the Copyright Act.” Id. at 2 (citing Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc.,
293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)); Whether Government Reproduction of Copyrighted
Materials Is a Noninfringing “Fair Use,” 23 Op. O.L.C. 87 (1999). But the resulting recom-
mendation assumes that copyrights may be protected.
226 See, e.g., OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8549 (Feb. 19, 1998); Recommen-
dation 78-4(6), supra note 201.
227 The full submission was not published in the Federal Register, but may be found in the
resulting FDMS Docket NARA-12-0002-0002. See Comment from Peter L. Strauss et al.,
Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law Sch., NARA-12-0002-0002 (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0002.
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through digital rights management, but, in addressing, sought to make this a require-
ment. The second condition would require public availability of any incorporated stan-
dards that had become by incorporation “regulatory standards or requirements.”228
The basic thrust of the petition was to urge revision of the federal practice to iden-
tify standards that would effect compliance with regulations independently stated,
rather than constituting the standards themselves as law.229 It associated this approach
with the uniform practice in the European Union and its member states of independently
stating regulatory requirements as obligatory performance standards, and identifying
appropriate voluntary consensus standards as assured, but not obligatory, means by
which those standards could be met.230 Given contemporary American preferences for
using regulations to set standards rather than proscribe specific rules, this approach ap-
peared readily adaptable here. Using it, the petition urged, would avoid the problem of
copyrighting law, while protecting the intellectual property of organizations able to iden-
tify effective means of compliance with law.231 It would also solve the problem of stasis
in incorporated standards. Agencies using soft rather than hard law techniques would
be free to identify new means of compliance using guidance mechanisms, without hav-
ing to undertake the formalities of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
A month after the OFR published this petition in the Federal Register with an invita-
tion for comment,232 the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA)
published there an additional request for comment, in connection with its possible revi-
sion of Circular A-119.233 This notice, too, raised questions about copyright protection
for incorporated standards.234 The resulting FDMS docket for the OFR petition235 con-
tained 162 items, and for the OIRA docket236 seventy-four, exploring a wide range of
issues and perspectives. These are captured as well in the growing literature addressing
the importance of privately generated standards to an increasingly global economy.237
SDO comments generally invoked the necessity of financial support for their
valuable work;238 the difficulties government agencies would face if they themselves
228 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8549 (Feb. 19, 1998).
229 See Comment from Peter L. Strauss et al., supra note 227.
230 See, e.g., BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5, at 154–55.
231 Id.
232 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,414 (Feb. 27, 2012) (requesting comments).
233 Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and
in Conformity Assessment Activities, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357 (Mar. 30, 2012).
234 Id. at 19,359.
235 DOCKET NARA-12-0002, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
236 DOCKET OMB-2012-0003, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
237 See generally BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5; SCHEPEL, supra note 192.
238 See, e.g., Comment from Daniel Saphire, Assistant General Counsel, AAR, NARA-12-
0002-0155 (June 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002
-0155 (discussing the Association of American Railroads reliance on funds generated by
charging for standards).
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attempted to generate standards;239 the expense agencies would face, in times of budget-
ary stringency, if they themselves had to purchase licenses broadly to publish the stan-
dards they incorporate;240 the federal policies encouraging the use of SDO standards
and the protection of SDO intellectual property in them;241 and the safeguards of the
standards-generating processes that meet the ANSI “essential requirements”242—open-
ness, lack of dominance, balance, coordination, public engagement through notice and
the consideration of views and objections, and adoption by consensus.243 While fre-
quently asserting that the prices charged for standards are “reasonable,” none of the
SDO comments suggested a means for regulating prices, either at the moment of incor-
poration or thereafter. Nor did they address the rulemaking petition’s suggestion that
agencies identify voluntary consensus standards as acceptable means for achieving
compliance with regulatory requirements independently stated, apparently preferring
incorporation that would create legal obligations (and so undergird their markets).
Although many of the comments supporting the petition were brief, emphatic state-
ments to the effect that legal obligations must be public, a number of NGOs, consumer
groups, and trade associations representing small businesses wrote in some detail.
Public.Resource.org,244 an organization that has been conducting a self-help campaign
to place standards on the Internet, defying the SDOs to sue it for copyright violation,245
239 See, e.g., Comment from Terrie S. Norris, President, Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, NARA-
12-0002-0132 (June 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12
-0002-0132 (discussing the limitation of OSHA’s ability to generate standards).
240 See, e.g., Comment from Eric P. Loewen, President, ANS, NARA-12-0002-0093, at
2 (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0093
(discussing the impact of costs on federal agencies).
241 See, e.g., Comment from August Schaefer, Senior Vice President and Public Safety
Officer, UL, NARA-12-0002-0146 (June 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=NARA-12-0002-0146.
242 See ANSI Essential Requirements, supra note 20.
243 Id.; see also Comment from ANSI, OMB-2012-0003-0024, at 7–8 (Apr. 30, 2012), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003-0024; Comment from June Ling,
Associate Executive Director, ASME Standards & Certification, ASME, OMB-2012-0003-
0010, at 4 (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012
-0003-0010.
244 PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, http://public.resource.org/about/index.html (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
245 After the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’ National Association
(SMACNA) claimed in January 2013 that Public.Resource.org’s publication of a federally
mandated 1985 standard on air-duct leakage no longer sold on its website violated its copyright,
Public.Resource.org sued it, asserting the copyright’s invalidity. See Corynne McSherry, EFF
Fights Courtroom Shenanigans After Wrongheaded Copyright Claim Blocks Publication of
Federal Law, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 29, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013 /05
/eff-fights-courtroom-shenanigans-after-wrongheaded-copyright-claim-blocks. SMACNA then
did not defend its claim. Id. In August, the NFPA, the ASTM International, and the American
Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers brought a still-pending action
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Public.Resource.org,
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filed numerous comments in both dockets.246 In addition to strenuously insisting on the
public’s need for access to the law that governs it, these comments catalogued a wide
range of problems in the incorporation by reference system: that of the 9,486 incorpo-
rated standards registered by NIST, 6,194 predate 1996;247 that Underwriters Labora-
tories today charges $849 to obtain a 1968 standard made law by OSHA in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910;248 numerous—still mandatory—standards are unavailable for purchase, 536
standards are listed in the NIST database without a date (a fundamental requirement),249
and others simply cannot be found.250 The Section of Administrative Law and Regula-
tory Practice extensively addressed the proposition that law is not subject to copyright.251
A variety of individuals and organizations involved with information technology
stressed both the success of standards generation in that field without copyright enforce-
ment and the undesirability of invoking the rulemaking rigidities that creation of legal
asserting that it had committed copyright violations when it published codes and standards
of theirs that government entities had incorporated into law. See Media Statement Regarding
Lawsuit Against PublicResource.org, NFPA (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.nfpa.org/press
-room/news-releases/2013/media-statement. For court documents, see Docket: ASTM v. Public
.Resource.org, Inc., http://ia600902.us.archive.org/33/items/gov.uscourts.dcd.161410/gov
.uscourts.dcd.161410.docket.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
246 Halperin & Malamud, OMB Comment, supra note 69; Halperin & Malamud, NARA
Comment, supra note 69.
247 See Comment from Carl Malamud, NARA-12-0002-0043, at 11 (Mar. 20, 2012), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0043 (“Of the 9,486 Regulatory
Incorporations registered by the National Institute of Standards, 6,194 of the Incorporations are
for standards from 1995 or earlier.”). Poster children for this problem are a Coast Guard regu-
lation dating from 1941, 46 C.F.R. § 160.041-4(b) (2012), requiring first aid kits to contain one-
hundred tablets of phenacetin (a painkiller that is internationally recognized as a carcinogen and
cause of kidney failure) and a PHMSA regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 173.32(c)(4) (2012), incorpo-
rating a 1943 standard for unfired pressure vessels. Comment from Carl Malamud, Public
.Resource.org, NARA-12-0002-0106, at 2 (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!docu
mentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0106 (“Not only are such old standards unsafe, they are impos-
sible to procure.”).
Scott Rafferty, echoing this concern, invokes the FDA’s insistence on a 1938 standard for
sulfonated coal that is no longer available for purchase and was updated by the ASTM in 2005.
“On average, a standard incorporated by reference in today’s [CFR] is 24 years old. . . . [T]he
benefits of consensus standard-setting are simply not consistent with the traditional cycle of for-
mal rulemaking.” Rafferty, OMB Comment, supra note 179, at 3. Nine agencies, he reports, cite
thirty-two different annual editions of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Code. Id. “[T]he FDA cites
to four out-of-print editions of the Food Chemicals Codex (1972–1996). Yet, it does not cite
any of the four editions issued in the last 16 years.” Id.
248 Comment from David Halperin & Carl Malamud, Public.Resource.org, OMB-2012-0003-
0008, at 1 (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003
-0008; cf. supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
249 Comment from David Halperin & Carl Malamud, supra note 248, at 10.
250 Id.; Comment from Carl Malamud, supra note 247.
251 Comment from Michael Herz, Section Chair, ABA Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory
Practice, NARA-12-0002-0157 (June 4, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail
;D=NARA-12-0002-0157.
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norms through incorporation by reference entails.252 Workers, small business entrepre-
neurs, and consumers are typically missing or under-represented in standards develop-
ment organizations—and especially so from the working groups and subcommittees
that perform the detail work on the generation of standards.253 Small business trade
252 See, e.g., Comment from Daniel Trebbien, NARA-12-0002-0086 (Mar. 28, 2012), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0086; Comment from Daniel
Trebbien, NARA-12-0002-0120 (May 29, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=NARA-12-0002-0120 (“In my current profession as a software developer, I have seen
first hand how openness or closedness of technical standards affects the profession.”); Comment
from Ken J. Salaets, Director, Information Technology, OMB-2012-0003-0041, at 3–4
(May 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003-0041
(“Given the dynamic nature of innovation and ICT standards development, governments should
be cautious about mandating adherence to any particular standard without demonstrating suffi-
cient need and without support from the impacted industry and relevant stakeholders. . . . Tech-
nical regulations can limit manufacturing flexibility, inhibit innovation, delay time to market and
distort product design. They can limit market choice and slow consumer price reductions.”);
Comment from Robert W. Holleyman, II, President and CEO, Business Software Alliance,
OMB-2012-0003-0042, at 2, 6 (May 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail
;D=OMB-2012-0003-0042 (“Voluntary processes have proven to be the most effective means
of fueling innovation through standards. . . . On the other hand, government-mandated standards
in the technology industry can often result in a number of unintended consequences. These
consequences may include:
i. unnecessarily freezing the development of new technologies and fail-
ing to reap fully the benefits of such quickly evolving technologies;
ii. inadvertently disadvantaging certain market competitors;
iii. hindering market acceptance and penetration; and,
iv. precluding a multi-faceted competitive environment . . . .
Government agencies . . . have a role to play, but they are most effective when facilitating vol-
untary processes rather than imposing rigid mandates.”).
253 Cf., e.g., ASME v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559–61 (1982) (describing commit-
tees and subcommittees). Writing in 1978, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., reported the deep concern
expressed by Calvin J. Collier, then Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, during hear-
ings for the Voluntary Standards and Certification Act in 1975–1976 that the SDOs did not
properly represent small businesses and consumers:
It is of great importance that standards reflect a proper balance between
the interests of all parties concerned, considering available technology.
These interests are best represented when affected persons participate in
the development process. Unfortunately, consumers and small businesses,
for a variety of reasons, have often been unable to participate. It is under-
standable, then, when standards favor parties whose financial strength
gave them a superior position in the process.
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THOUGHTS ON INTEREST REPRESENTATION
AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 7–8 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Writing at about
the same time, Robert Hamilton argued that:
Because of the . . . industry orientation of most technical committees, the
costs and complexity of increased safety or purity will almost certainly
be weighted more heavily by these committees than by an individual
whose primary concern is safety or health . . . . The welter of legislative
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associations asserted both the difficulties they experienced in participating in standard-
setting, and the financial burdens created by licensing fees.254 Consumer groups criticize
enactments vesting issues of safety or health in the governmental agencies
suggests that for many people the balance provided by the private sector
often fails to accommodate health or safety considerations satisfactorily.
Robert Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1378 (1978).
254 See, e.g., Comment from Michael A. Caldarera, Vice President, Regulatory & Technical
Services, Nat’l Propane Gas Assoc., OMB-2012-0003-0058 (May 31, 2012), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003-0058 (discussing how the $645 cost
to access standards proposed for incorporation by reference by the PHMSA was “extremely
excessive” for its small business membership); Comment from Chris R. Calkins, TenderSpec,
LLC, OMB-2012-0003-0026 (May 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D
=OMB-2012-0003-0026 (commenting on the difficulties of securing timely notice); Comment
from Jerry Call, supra note 90, at 2 (“$75 is not much for a standard, but a typical small manu-
facturer, including a foundry, may be subject to as many as 1000 standards. The ASTM foundry
safety standard alone cross-references 35 other consensus standards and that is just the tip of the
iceberg . . . .”); Comment from John L. Conley, supra note 90 (emphasizing the particular prob-
lem of purchasing standards not yet incorporated in order to comment on NPRMs and remark-
ing that small businesses “have no option but to purchase the material at whatever price is set
by the body which develops and copyrights the information. . . . [W]e cite the need for many
years for the tank truck industry to purchase a full publication from the Compressed Gas
Association just to find out what the definition of a ‘dent’ was . . . . HM241 could impact up to
41,366 parties and . . . there is no limit on how much the bodies could charge . . . .”); Comment
from John Eichberger, Vice President, Government Relations, Nat’l Assoc. of Convenience
Stores, OMB-2012-0003-0034 (May 1, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D
=OMB-2012-0003-0034 (discussing how the domination of the Payment Card Industry Security
Standards Council (PCISSC) by large electronic payment companies resulted in standards sub-
jecting others “to an elevated risk of fraud”); Comment from Winslow Sargeant, supra note 164,
at 4 (“‘[C]onsensus,’ as implemented by major SDOs, can be manipulated to achieve stan-
dards that advance a particular policy preference or create market opportunities for select pro-
viders but do not represent a consensus among regulated entities . . . . [C]ommittee leadership
can identify a diversity of interests that serves to dilute the voice of those parties most directly
affected . . . . [And] small entities often lack the opportunity to challenge the result.”).
Particularly revealing of these problems are the comments of the National Grain and Feed
Association (NGFA), addressing an OSHA proposal to amend its grain handling regulation
associated with fires and explosions, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.272 (2012). Comment by Jess McCluer,
supra note 90, at 2. OSHA had issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking suggest-
ing that it would replace existing regulatory text by incorporating National Fire Protection
Association Standard 61. Yet, as NGFA observed:
NFPA standards offer a far more complex, stringent protocol that may be
adopted in whole or in part by industry participants, voluntarily. These
guidelines play an important role as voluntary practices that can enhance
safety efforts. But they are entirely inappropriate as a replacement for
effective rulemaking . . . . A review and comparison of 1910.272 and
NFPA 61 reveals that there are more than 146 additional provisions ad-
dressing design, construction, and operation of affected grain handling
facilities. Neither the NFPA technical committee, nor any other NFPA
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safety issues posed by standards essentially developed by industries with incentives to
minimize risks to save costs.255
The published literature about incorporation recognizes, in particular, the significant
chance that standards will often favor the interests of established industry.256 For exam-
ple, housing codes may favor rigid water piping requiring the services of plumbers over
flexible piping that both is more readily used by do-it-yourselfers and also could permit
some uses to which rigid piping is not well adapted.257 In this line of thought,
industry representatives tend to dominate decisionmaking in many
nonprofit organizations, and the standards that are produced tend to
reflect the self-interest of the corporations for whom the partici-
pants work. The lack of non-industry representatives leads private
standard-setting organizations to strike a different balance between
committee, conducts [either] an economic impact study . . . [or]
consider[s] the impact of the feasibility or cost of its detailed recommen-
dations on industry and small businesses, in particular. . . . Only NFPA
participants, who are required to pay to play, have the ability to comment
in the development of consensus standards.
Comment from Jess McCluer, supra note 90, at 2–3.
255 See, e.g., Comment from Rachel Weintraub, Director of Product Safety and Senior
Counsel, Consumer Fed’n of Am., OMB-2012-0003-0060 (May 31, 2012), http://www.regula
tions.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003-0060 (assuring the adequacy of voluntary
safety standards requires not only consensus among participants, but also adequate consumer
participation, a transparent process with shared, understandable information, agency participa-
tion in the consensus process and regulatory oversight for adequacy, such that the standard is
not “wholly controlled by industry”); Comment from Rebecca Craven, Program Director, Pipe-
line Safety Trust, NARA-12-0002-0092 (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!docu
mentDetail;D=NARA-12-0002-0092 (asserting that the PHMSA had incorporated by reference
eighty-five standards privately developed by trade associations, “[d]eliver[ing] measurable
value to AGA members” and not engaging the public). As an example, the Trust invoked the
API’s development of the Public Awareness standard, RP 1162—then incorporated by reference
by the PHMSA—for which it attempted to charge a House Committee $1,195 for access. See
Halperin, supra note 68 and accompanying text. Furthermore:
The process was controlled by industry, even though industry has no par-
ticular expertise . . . [and] [t]he many possible independent experts and
organizations in the field . . . were not sought and ultimately were not a
part of the development of this standard . . . . [T]his is not a “voluntary
consensus standard”—this is an industry standard developed by and for
industry. Nor is it a “technical standard” as that term was defined by
Congress in the NTTAA . . . . RP 1162 is a 50+ page long set of recom-
mendations, options, considerations, and possibilities.
Comment from Rebecca Craven, supra, at 5, 9.
256 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 534,
640–42, 642 nn.403 & 406 (2000).
257 See, e.g., Plumbing With PEX Tubing, THE FAMILY HANDYMAN, http://www.family
handyman.com/plumbing/plumbing-with-pex-tubing/view-all (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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cost and protection than that favored by non-industry actors. . . .
[S]tandards provide limited protection for workers in many cases,
because industry-dominated committees are more reluctant than
OSHA to characterize a substance as a carcinogen, and less
likely to rely on published scientific data instead of industry-
supplied information.258
Movement has begun on these issues on several fronts, in response both to the peti-
tion and to a statute Congress enacted in response to the API’s misjudgment in asking
a House Committee to pay to see its pipeline safety warning standard,259 which re-
sulted in a number of meetings to address future directions.260 On October 2, 2013, as
this Article was entering the final editing process, ANSI announced its development of
an incorporation by reference portal where standards could be viewed without payment,
under stringent read-only protections,261 and the OFR published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that, on initial impression, appears to attempt a response to the problems
of transparency during the rulemaking proposal stage, but is considerably less promising
in other respects.262 The remainder of this Article looks at possibilities for SDOs to pre-
serve at least the core of their business model, while permitting the public to comment
on rulemaking proposals and learn about the law’s obligations without having to pay
what might be monopoly prices to do so.
III. CAN THE PUBLIC HAVE ITS ACCESS-TO-LAW CAKE AND STANDARDS
DEVELOPERS EAT REVENUE FROM STANDARDS SALES TOO?
A. Proposed Rulemaking and Digital Rights Management
Given the current law of rulemaking, not to mention the transformations worked by
the development of Regulations.gov and its associated FDMS, agencies have strong
258 Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulations, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 407–08 &
nn.70 & 73 (2003) (citations omitted).
259 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. The statute, Public Law 112-90 section
24, has recently been amended to lessen somewhat its severity, but still has raised considerable
anxiety in the SDO community. Pub. L. No. 113-30, 127 Stat. 510 (2013) (to be codified at
49 U.S.C. 60102(p)).
260 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS., PUBLIC WORKSHOP: IMPLEMENTING INCORPORATION BY
REFERENCE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 24 OF THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT OF 2011, available
at http://mediasite.yorkcast.com/webcast/Play/e8c2cc8919ef41a7821e7f6c85b35f111d.
261 See Bhatia & Shannon Remarks, supra note 216.
262 Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-02/pdf/2013-24217.pdf. The comment period for the proposal,
when last seen, permitted comments to be filed until January 31, 2014, and it appears likely new
regulations will then be published. Id.
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incentives to follow ACUS’s Recommendation to assure commenters’ access to SDO
standards underlying their rulemaking proposals. Few agencies would wish to take the
risk that an important rulemaking would be found invalid months—if not years—down
the road because they had failed to give commenters adequate notice of the content of
their proposals or the underlying studies.263 For many would-be commenters, having to
pay to learn the content of what is, at the moment, only a proposal for rulemaking would
be a disabling obstacle. Yet for the SDO, having to make public what at the moment is
only a voluntary standard, not yet a regulatory obligation, and thus unquestionably still
under copyright, could threaten income necessary for its continued success. Might tem-
porary access under digital rights management regimes that sharply reduces—if not
eliminates—threats of misappropriation, encouraged by the ACUS recommendations,
provide one means by which this dilemma might be softened?
In its recent rulemaking proposal,264 the OFR acknowledged that it is not authorized
formally to approve (or disapprove) proposed incorporations by reference, but proposed
to return to the agency (i.e., without publication) any notice of proposed rulemaking
involving incorporation that did not either: “(1) Discuss the ways in which it worked
to make the materials it proposes to incorporate by reference reasonably available to
interested parties in the preamble of the proposed rule, or (2) Summarize the material
it proposes to incorporate by reference in the preamble of the proposed rule.”265
In conjunction with the ACUS recommendations, this is certainly a push in the
direction of disclosing information about incorporated matter that may permit reason-
able comment, although it falls short of requiring disclosure of the standards them-
selves, and the proposal’s continuing failure to suggest a definition of “reasonably
available” (together with repeated discussion in the rulemaking preamble of the OFR’s
limited resources) leaves agencies on their own to decide what might satisfy this ele-
ment. Part 51, in language not proposed to be changed, indicates that
51.7(a) A publication is eligible for incorporation by reference
under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) if it— . . .
(4) Is reasonably available to and usable by the class of persons
affected by the publication. In determining whether a publica-
tion is usable, the Director will consider—
(i) The completeness and ease of handling of the publica-
tion; and
(ii) Whether it is bound, numbered, and organized.266
Since usability is defined and indicated to be a matter that the Director will consider,
it seems rather clear that beyond taking into custody one print copy of the matter to be
263 Cf. supra note 179 and accompanying text.
264 Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013).
265 Id. at 60,797 (proposing new language for 1 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)).
266 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a) (2013).
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incorporated, and requiring the agency to maintain another, the Director is eschewing
any enforcement of “reasonable availability” standards.
SDOs appear increasingly to be recognizing the importance of making standards
materials available during rulemakings, as well as encouraging participation in their own
voluntary consensus processes. ANSI’s announced creation of an IBR portal on which
standards will be available without charge on a digital-rights-managed, read-only basis
is one indicator;267 individual SDOs have already been moving in this direction.
Consider in this regard the approach taken by the North American Energy Standards
Board (NAESB),268 which uses a commercial program, LockLizard Safeguard Secure
PDF Viewer,269 to permit requesters three days of one-time access to any standard the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may propose to adopt as a regulatory
requirement.270 The NAESB acts often in contemplation that FERC will adopt its stan-
dards as regulatory law, and its activities in support of FERC rulemaking may illustrate
ways in which SDOs can then facilitate rulemaking development building on SDO
standards. A trade organization of about 300 corporate members with some regulatory
members as well,271 the NAESB’s work has become particularly important as “smart
267 See Bhatia & Shannon Remarks, supra note 216.
268 NAESB, http://www.naesb.org (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). Conventional sources about
the NAESB and its operations include William P. Boswell & James P. Cargas, North American
Energy Standards Board: Legal and Administrative Underpinnings of a Consensus Based
Organization, 27 ENERGY L.J. 147 (2006), and Federal Energy Guidelines (FERC) discussions
of its use of NAESB in rulemaking statements of basis and purpose, such as Order Providing
Guidance on the Formation of a Standards Development Organization for the Wholesale Elec-
tric Industry, 97 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289 (Dec. 19, 2001), on reh’g 99 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,171 (May 16,
2002), and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Standards for Business Practices of Interstate
Natural Gas Pipelines, 70 Fed. Reg. 319 (Jan. 4, 2005). Extensive conversations and correspon-
dence with Rae McQuade, President and Chief Operating Officer of the NAESB, during
September and October 2012 have also added greatly to my understanding of the organization,
and the paragraphs about it that follow. E-mails from Rae McQuade, President and Chief
Operating Officer, NAESB, to author (on file with author). The NAESB is also relied upon by
state utility commissions and other SDOs. Many of its roughly 3,000 standards have been incor-
porated by reference, and some are in use internationally. Id. Although the NAESB is an SDO
credentialed by ANSI, because its standards are so likely to be incorporated by reference, few
of them are made ANSI standards. Id.
269 Secure PDF File Viewer, LOCKLIZARD LIMITED, http://www.locklizard.com/pdf_security
.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
270 The NAESB filed a detailed account of its copyright policy with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission November 12, 2012. RAE MCQUADE, REPORT OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN ENERGY STANDARDS BOARD: THE NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY 3 (2012) [herein-
after NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY], available at http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/ferc112012_naesb
_copyright.pdf.
271 NAESB Membership List as of September 5, 2013, NAESB, http://www.naesb.org/pdf4
/memstats.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). While its corporate members must pay a $7,000
annual membership fee, NAESB Membership Application, NAESB (Apr. 30, 2013), http://
www.naesb.org [hereinafter NAESB Membership Application], any state utility commission
may become a member without fee under the umbrella of a single annual $500 payment by the
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grids,”272 consumer choice, and the possibility that some consumers will be both supply-
ing power to and taking power from, electric transmission lines have become significant
market realities. The NAESB has a particularly tight relationship with FERC’s regula-
tion of interstate markets in electricity and natural gas and often initiates standards
development at its request,273 without seeking FERC compensation for doing so.274
In line with, and perhaps exceeding in some respects, the ANSI “Essential
Requirements,”275 the NAESB’s procedures for adopting standards engage those com-
munities that will likely be directly affected by its work. Those opportunities to influ-
ence the standards are readily comparable to federal rulemaking procedures. It develops
its working agenda on the basis of inputs from many sources, often non-members. That
agenda and most materials considered in the course of standard development are readily
viewed on its website.276 Its leadership asserted in conversation,277 although its web page
does not seem to show,278 that it regularly reaches out to non-member trade associations,
consumer advocates, etc., and that it is possible to join distribution lists to assure active
notice of developments of possible interest.279 When the NAESB submits standards to
FERC (or other public bodies) for possible incorporation by reference, its submission
includes full documentation of the proposal’s development—committee minutes, voting
records, submitted comments, etc.280 As distinct from the proposed standard itself,
which may be purchased from the NAESB or briefly accessed under digital rights man-
agement, all this material is then publicly accessible during FERC’s comment period,
should FERC issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that would incorporate the stan-
dard by reference. In this respect, the material available to the public tracks much of
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). NARUC, http://www
.naruc.org (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). At least California, Connecticut, Maine, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have availed themselves of this possibility; the Department
of Energy and NIST are also members.
272 THE SMART GRID, http://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid#smart_grid (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013) (“[T]he Smart Grid will consist of controls, computers, automation, and new
technologies and equipment working together . . . with the electrical grid to respond digitally
to our quickly changing electric demand.”); see also infra note 291 and accompanying text.
273 Letter from Jonathan Booe, Deputy Director, NAESB, to Dr. Patrick Gallagher, Director,
NIST, at 3 (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://www.nist.gov/standardsgov/upload/NAESB.pdf.
274 E-mails from Rae McQuade, supra note 268.
275 See ANSI Essential Requirements, supra note 20.
276 Quadrant Business Standards Implementation and Code Repository, NAESB, http://
www.naesb.org/materials/bscr.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (providing links to forms and
information which allows members and non-members to view or request development activity
for their business type).
277 E-mails from Rae McQuade, supra note 268.
278 NAESB, http://www.naesb.org (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
279 E-mails from Rae McQuade, supra note 268.
280 See RAE MCQUADE, REPORT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY STANDARDS BOARD:
VERSION 003 OF THE NAESB WHOLESALE ELECTRIC QUADRANT BUSINESS PRACTICE
STANDARDS (Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter NAESB BUSINESS PRACTICE STANDARDS], available
at http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/ferc_091812_weq_version003_report.pdf.
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what would be available to the public commenting on a direct federal agency rule-
making proposal. An electronic filing from September 18, 2012, respecting wholesale
electric quadrant standards prints out at 345 pages.281
Yet the business model the NAESB has developed well illustrates the tensions that
may exist between provision for open participation in standards generation and genera-
tion of the financial resources required to perform one’s function effectively. Histori-
cally, non-members could freely participate and vote on NAESB committees as they
worked on standards development, and sixty to seventy percent of participants on single
topics were non-members.282 The NAESB relied on its members’ dues payments, to-
gether with sales revenues from standards, to finance its activities.283 Recently, however,
the NAESB found that some utilities and other energy corporations, on which it relied
for these payments, had become free-riders, depriving the organization of needed dues
revenues by availing themselves of its free access policy. Thus, the NAESB has recently
joined the many SDOs requiring one to “pay to play” in an active sense. Non-members
face charges for meeting participation by telephone or in person ($100 for a meeting of
four hours or less; $300 for a longer one), or for a year’s participation in the work of
a given subcommittee ($1,000).284 There is no charge to submit comments, however,285
and any comments submitted must be considered.286
Perhaps also to protect its revenue streams from free-riding, or its standards from
“unintended” display in official documents that would be freely available on agency
websites, the NAESB has forcefully asserted its right to license (or refused to license)
use of their standards in any agency proceeding.287 In providing limited Digital Rights
Management (DRM) access to its standards, as when they are proposed for incorpora-
tion by reference in FERC, it withholds any right to quote from those standards in com-
ments it filed with FERC (much less elsewhere) beyond what “fair use” permits.288
281 Id.
282 E-mails from Rae McQuade, supra note 268.
283 See NAESB Membership Application, supra note 271.
284 NAESB Current Committee Activities, NAESB, http://www.naesb.org/committee_activ
ities.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter NAESB Current Committee Activities].
285 NAESB, NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY & PARTICIPATION SYNOPSIS (May 28, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/bd_revenue032013w2.doc.
286 See MCQUADE, NAESB BUSINESS PRACTICE STANDARDS, supra note 280.
287 See MCQUADE, NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY, supra note 270.
288 Except under the limited circumstances specifically permitted by the Fair
Use Doctrine, NAESB considers it a copyright infringement to quote any
part of its standards as part of filings with the Commission. Such limited
circumstances may include Commission proceedings such as complaints,
rate cases, and protests to rate cases. However, parties should always
consult with NAESB prior to the use of any verbatim quote of copy-
righted material.
MCQUADE, NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY, supra note 270, at 5. The September 18, 2012,
NAESB filing contains no mention of rulemaking and appears to be principally concerned with
quotations made in the course of compliance filings and/or tariffs—that is, filings likely to be
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Anyone who wants to reason with FERC about whether they ought to convert that
standard into a regulatory obligation or if, it has been converted, whether they have
complied with the standard or if the standard bears on some action for which they re-
quire regulatory approval must now obtain the NAESB’s permission to quote its lan-
guage in their filings.
The NAESB is only one participant in a standards development activity that illus-
trates both the importance of assuring continuing support for standards development and
its close relationship to the kinds of activities American-administrative law has long
committed to fully open public notice and participation. The generation and consump-
tion of electric power has become notably more complex as new sources dependent on
variable inputs (e.g., wind farms, solar panels) and possibilities for cogeneration have
been added,289 national networks have expanded,290 and our awareness of potential
sources of disruption (e.g., solar storms, for example) has increased.291 Assuring stable,
reliable interoperability—what standards have long been about—has become the work
of a Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) operating under the aegis of NIST.292
NIST’s recent Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards,
Release 2.0293 runs 225 tightly packed pages, citing thirty-seven already-identified
standards, such as a suite of ANSI standards for data collection and transmission,294 and
an additional sixty-one standards still under review.295 In general, the standards have
been developed under the NIST’s requirements for transparency, open participation, and
made by organizations whose membership it hopes to attract. Cf. MCQUADE, NAESB BUSINESS
PRACTICE STANDARDS, supra note 280. Membership in itself confers access to standards, and
while that access is limited to internal use it also creates a relationship within which external
uses may be bargained out. MCQUADE, NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY, supra note 270, at
app. A-2.
289 See supra note 272; infra note 292.
290 See supra note 272; infra note 292.
291 E.g., LLOYD’S, ATMOSPHERIC & ENVT’L RESEARCH, SOLAR STORM RISK TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN ELECTRIC GRID (2013), available at http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Lloyds/Reports
/Emerging%20Risk%20Reports/Solar%20Storm%20Risk%20to%20the%20North%20Ameri
can%20Electric%20Grid%20.pdf.
292 Today’s electric power grid ranks as the single greatest engineering
achievement of the 20th century. And tomorrow’s smart grid will be
one of the greatest achievements of the 21st century. By linking infor-
mation technologies with the electric power grid—to provide “elec-
tricity with a brain”—the smart grid promises many benefits, including
increased energy efficiency, reduced carbon emissions, and improved
power reliability.
Smart Grid, WISI, http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
293 See NIST, NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY
STANDARDS, RELEASE 2.0 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter NIST ROADMAP], available at http://www
.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/NIST_Framework_Release_2-0_corr.pdf.
294 Id. at 70–105.
295 Id. at 107–38.
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“reasonable” (but not free)296 accessibility.297 Importantly for the purpose of this Article,
FERC appears to have accepted the NIST’s advice that the standards are best used as
“appropriate signals to the marketplace . . . without mandating compliance with partic-
ular standards. The NIST adds that it would be impractical and unnecessary for the
Commission to adopt individual interoperability standards.”298 So long as this advice
is followed, the “law” problem with which this Article is concerned would not be pres-
ent; however, the fees the SGIP has found necessary to charge for participation in its
deliberations,299 as well as its impending conversion from the NIST dependency into an
independent NGO, to be sustained by substantial dues requirements,300 well illustrate
the financial imperatives present in our reliance on SDOs for standards creation.
B. Standards Developed in the Expectation of Incorporation
Perhaps in rulemaking comments one could avoid the need to quote extensive lan-
guage from the standard being proposed for incorporation. Any quotations might readily
fit ideas of fair use and be brief enough to fit comfortably within the dimensions of fair
use. And perhaps the temporal, one-time-only limit the NAESB imposes on the free
DRM access it offers to its standard—at that moment still merely a voluntary standard—
should be regarded as sufficiently enabling of the comment process. Once a standard
has been converted into a legal obligation, however, needs that the regulated and regu-
latory beneficiaries may have for access to its terms are permanent, not time-limited,
and may be frequent. Even more striking, the NAESB states it is prepared to enforce
the proposition that its language may not be quoted in documents submitted to the reg-
ulator whose law it is without a license from it at the price it chooses to charge.301 Even
its members have free access to its standards only for their internal use.302 They are not
to be shared with others.
Perhaps the NAESB’s concern is again with free-riding—that publication of its
standards in public pleadings, or even the possibility of repeated access to them, might
create a purchase substitute for those who could otherwise be steady customers. The
296 It perhaps bears repeating that there appear to be neither standards nor enforcement
mechanisms in place to determine what is a “reasonable” fee.
297 See NIST ROADMAP, supra note 293, at 62–63.
298 Id. at 8 (quoting 136 FERC ¶ 61,039, available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar
/Files/20110719143912-RM11-2-000.pdf).
299 SGIP membership costs, which vary depending on degree of participation, are available
on its website. Smart Grid Interoperability Panel, Membership, SGIP, http://www.sgip.org
/membership/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
300 Letter from John D. McDonald, P.E. Chair, SGIP Governing Board, to SGIP Members
(July 11, 2012), available at http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/July
2012McDonaldLetter.
301 MCQUADE, NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY, supra note 270, at 3.
302 Id. at app. A-2 (authorizing NAESB members in good standing to “reproduce material
therein for internal reference and use”).
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concerns seem overdrawn. Neither participants before FERC, nor FERC itself, will
likely have any need to quote standards in extenso in proceedings in which those stan-
dards may be at issue, just those aspects relevant to the case. The doctrine of “fair
use”303 seems well suited to situations in which quotation might reasonably be thought
compelled. And the use of digital rights management for controlled access, at any
time when access is needed, seems the modern equivalent of the law-library access
Congress imagined in requiring a finding of reasonable availability when it enacted
§ 552(a)(1).304
At root of the issue here may be the nature of the NAESB’s close relationship with
FERC. If it is not quite the SBCCI,305 nonetheless it is developing its standards not as
voluntary standards that may prove persuasive in market operations, but precisely in
the contemplation that they will be a useful product for FERC to incorporate in legal
obligations.306 Perhaps driven by budgetary considerations or by the statutory preference
for voluntary standards embodied in the NTTAA,307 FERC, in effect, has asked the
NAESB to develop standards that it might have formulated through rulemaking of its
own. Similarly, it appears, the PHMSA relied on the API to generate its public pipe-
line safety hazard warning standards.308 Neither the NAESB nor the API standards are
“technical” standards in NTTAA terms,309 and self-evidently they are standards in
which the public as well as the members of the NAESB or the API would have a consid-
erable interest. It should be quickly apparent that the outsourcing is essentially contrac-
tual, making the opportunity to bargain for price, and the reasons for doing so, strong.
If the NAESB or the API thought it needed compensation for the work an agency was
effectively delegating to it, that could be agreed upon at the outset—with the result that
the work product, as law, would be public.310 And if this were a public contracting pro-
cess with, say, a “request for proposal,” (RFP) process, it is at least possible that a less
“interested” applicant would appear. The prospect of competition to provide this service
for the agency would be real (as would be the possibility that the agency would decide
that self-production would be cheaper) and any opportunity for monopoly pricing of
law would be eliminated.
303 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
304 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006).
305 See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
306 Cf. MCQUADE, NAESB COPYRIGHT POLICY, supra note 270, at 3.
307 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110
Stat. 775, 783 (1996).
308 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
309 See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act § 12.
310 One might also believe that when entering into such an agreement, the PHMSA should
insist that the API achieve the levels of openness for data relied upon, views submitted, and rea-
soning that the PHMSA itself would be held to in notice-and-comment rulemaking—consid-
erably more, as has been suggested, than ANSI’s “Essential Requirements” entail—but that is
an argument for another day.
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Effectively outsourcing rulemaking not only suggests a level of trust in the disinter-
estedness of the standard-setter that not all persons affected by its standards might find
warranted; but it also has the potential of defeating many of the procedural safeguards
of federal notice-and-comment rulemaking, hiding from public (and agency) view the
data, formative private inputs, and even reasoning that FDMS dockets reveal to all.311
Negotiating in advance the terms of what is in effect contracted-out rulemaking would
permit the rulemaking agency to specify the procedures by which the desired standards
will be generated: what and how notice will be given; whether persons wishing to par-
ticipate can be required to “pay to play,” as is often SDO practice;312 lodging the full
records of the standards-generation process with the rulemaking agency as a public
record that will be available during the agency’s own notice-and-comment process; the
nature of explanations the SDO should give for controverted policy choices made; etc.
The NAESB’s procedures seem reasonably to have met these standards;313 the API’s
procedures leave more room for doubt.314 Without such measures, an agency’s reduction
of the cost of conducting its own subsequent rulemaking can have the consequence
of considerably reducing the visibility of, and the public’s access to, the standards-
generation process.
Moreover, the NAESB’s approach post-adoption, when its standards have been con-
verted into legal obligation, is indeed questionably justified, for an SDO that has created
its standards in coordination with an agency and in expectation of their incorporation.
Here, Veeck315 has its clearest application, as does Professor Cunningham’s persuasive
typology.316 Unhindered digital right management access might, in this context, be seen
as an acceptable middle ground, preserving the print market likely to be used by those
having to consult the standards as a whole and with regularity. And it marks an ap-
proach with a history of successful implementation in the SDO community. As the SDO
community heard at a recent conference,317 for ten years, the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) has permitted access to all of its standards under digital rights
management at any time, without charge.318 Its codes as a whole, rendered in portable
311 See, e.g., supra notes 254–55 and accompanying text.
312 See NAESB CURRENT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES, supra note 284 and accompanying text.
313 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
314 See, e.g., supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
315 See Veeck v. SBCCI, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
316 See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
317 James M. Shannon, CEO, NFPA, Government Reliance on Voluntary Consensus Stan-
dards and Conformance Programs, Remarks at the ANSI World Standards Week 2013 Open
Forum (Washington, D.C., Oct. 2, 2013).
318 James M. Shannon, CEO, NFPA, Remarks at the 2012 NFPA Conference & Expo,
YOUTUBE, at 15:04 (June 11, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embed
ded&v=DdLgV-nEg3g#t=16 (“More than ten years ago we put all of our codes and standards
on our website and made them available to anyone who wants to review them. On our RealRead
site, the standards can’t be downloaded or printed but anyone can read all of our codes and
standards online without paying a fee. We were the first standards developing organization to
do that.”).
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form, are what have sustaining value in the market—and, of course, their incorporation
creates that market.319
C. Standards Developed Independently of Any Expectation of Their Incorporation
The preceding paragraphs have largely concerned standards created in direct con-
templation of their immediate use by government bodies. Matters are somewhat differ-
ent for voluntary consensus standards that have been created without expectation of
their possible incorporation as legal obligations—particularly in cases where the agency
wishes or needs to incorporate only a part of the standard. Unlike the SBCCI or the API,
the ASME would in some sense be surprised by the conversion of all or part of one of
its voluntary standards into a legal obligation. In the commercial-use context for which
it was created, its copyright is entirely unexceptional, and its market depends on its util-
ity, not at all on compulsions that may have been created by its (perhaps surprising)
conversion into a legal obligation. On this assumption, there could have been no bar-
gained price, no prior contractual arrangement to develop the standard. If incorporation
by reference served to lift the copyright and thus damage the market for the standard,
that unexpected conversion would appear to be a taking that—as with all governmental
expropriations of private property—should be properly compensated.320 One might
think, too, that requiring the government to assess in advance the value of what it would
be taking, rather than leaving that value to be reaped from others on the subsequent mar-
ket for knowledge of the law, had the potential to control the most problematic charac-
teristic of private standard-setting, the appearance that public power has been placed in
private hands. When agencies discover useful standards, rather than seek their creation,
this concern is subdued.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that a “takings” rationale would not take one so
far as to permit the prior owners to charge members of the public to know the law.
When the government takes private property for use as a public park there is a
319 That portable form, the NFPA realizes, increasingly must be digital, and its business
model is being changed to reflect the realities of the Information Age—including the questions
now being raised about the copyright protection available for standards that have been con-
verted into law. Content Strategy, supra note 23 (“We have had great success over the years
using a business model in which the principal source of revenue was the sale of print editions
of our codes and standards. That business model is no longer sustainable.”). On September 10,
2012, it announced that it was converting the terms of electronic sales of its standards into a
“social” digital rights form making purchased standards usable on all of a purchaser’s digital
equipment; they will now be sold with an embedded watermark identifying the purchaser. Press
Release, NFPA, NFPA Removes DRM on PDFs (Sept. 10, 2012), available at http://www.nfpa
.org/press-room/news-releases/2012/nfpa-removes-drm-on-pdfs.
320 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“Private Property [shall not] be taken for public use without
just compensation.”).
2013] PRIVATE STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 547
single payment for the property taken; not a retained right to charge anyone who might
subsequently want to use the park, such admission fee as the prior owner cared to set.
This argument is the stronger, considering that no one is compelled to use a park that the
government has chosen to create, whether by expropriation or not. Like the fees charged
for obtaining those standards that remain voluntary, park fees are controlled by the pos-
sibility of substitutions in the market. Substitutions are not possible for standards that
have been converted into legal obligations. Moreover, if incorporation by reference pre-
serves copyright in what previously was just a voluntary standard, that creates for the
SDO an exclusive market for publication that might otherwise have been served by one
of its competitors;321 this anti-competitive impact, not merely a private organization’s
unusual power to set monopoly prices for learning the law, further undercuts copyright-
preserving alternatives.
The “takings” possibility, then, warrants some attention. The standard argument of
the SDOs, and a concern of government agencies, is that this would be unacceptably
expensive for the agencies. In effect, the income stream from sale of incorporated stan-
dards is taken as a substitute for direct payment of “just compensation.”322 It seems
problematic, however, to transform the prospective price for a taking—unmistakably
a governmental obligation that may be judicially fixed if agreement on it cannot be
reached—into a price unilaterally set by monopolists on private parties with little
choice about purchase. Congress has in other contexts set its face against “unfunded
mandates,”323 and that concern seems equally applicable here. Nor is it clear that agen-
cies would in fact be obliged to pay high prices for their use of SDO standards if a
takings analysis were in place.
The agency can control, if not entirely eliminate, that value if it incorporates only
those elements of a standard that it finds regulation to require, and not the whole of the
SDO’s work product. As already noted, voluntary consensus standards often go into
much more detail than would be necessary, or even appropriate, to require by regu-
lation.324 If an agency incorporates by reference only the definition of a “dent” from
complex standards on tank truck safety,325 making that definition public—the only pub-
lication that would be required—could hardly diminish the commercial value of the
standards as a whole. Whether or not conceptualized as fair use, such care to incorporate
no more of a set of standards than its needs entail might thus control the takings ques-
tion. A database to which access was free, but under digital rights management control,
would meet the statutory test of “reasonable availability” in the Computer Age, and
seem likely to reinforce, not undercut, the value of the full standard in print.
321 See, e.g., supra notes 80–85, 204 and accompanying text.
322 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
323 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
324 See supra note 254.
325 See Comment from John L. Conley, supra note 254, at 2.
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Moreover, SDO claims to finance their operations through sale of their “voluntary
consensus standards”326 are time-limited in a way that arguments for continuous
government protection of their intellectual property rights do not respect. ANSI’s
“Essential Requirements” include frequent reassessment of any voluntary consensus
standards it accredits—in general, no less frequently than every five years.327 Since it
will take some time for an accredited voluntary standard to be transformed into a legal
obligation, one can have some confidence that the price initially asked for the standard
will be a market price. It is a voluntary standard; there are at best market compulsions
to purchase it. Since it takes time to incorporate the standard by reference, when that
happens only two or three years may be left before, in its existence as a voluntary con-
sensus standard, it has been replaced by a revised version.328 That revised version is
now the voluntary consensus standard, and that is the standard whose price will in some
sense be dictated by the market for such standards. Any claim of right to compensation
for the loss of sales of superannuated standards that an SDO has in fact changed on its
own books seems outside a business model premised on sales of voluntary standards.
Independent of its conversion into law by incorporation, a standard’s commercial value
will have been eliminated, or at the very least greatly reduced, by its revision.329 Any
price an SDO might be able to charge for access to that displaced standard would owe
its value just to the standard’s transformation into law, and not to its copyright as
such.330 And the great majority of standards that remain legal requirements today are
more than fifteen years old.331
One of the ways, then, that SDOs might protect their appropriate business model—
that is, their reliance on sales into the market for voluntary consensus standards—would
be simply to abandon claims that superannuated standards may not be made public. If
the claim for the right to sell access to the standard were limited to the period between
its adoption as a voluntary consensus standard and its revision, one could have some
confidence that the price charged would be that for a standard, and not for law. One
would not encounter situations like that presented by the American Herbal Products
Association (AHPA), selling the contemporary version of its standards as a copyable
and transferable physical book for forty percent of the price charged for the older, but
incorporated standards, sold under tightly restrictive digital rights management.332 Corre-
spondingly, whatever an agency’s reluctance to place in its electronic reading room the
text of a contemporary standard it had only recently incorporated by reference, it could
with confidence place that text there once the voluntary standard, but not yet its regula-
tion, had been revised.
326 See About ANSI Overview, supra note 8.
327 See ANSI Essential Requirements, supra note 20, § 4.7.1.
328 See supra Part II.A.
329 See, e.g., supra notes 79–85, 101 and accompanying text.
330 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 79–85.
331 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 79–85.
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D. Must Incorporation by Reference Create Legal Obligations?
Part 51, the OFR regulations on incorporation by reference,333 currently insists that
incorporation is proper only if it entails a legal obligation and, doubtless for this reason,
goes on to provide that future revisions of the incorporated standard cannot be referred
to.334 The recent rulemaking proposal suggests no purpose to soften this restriction,
which bears much of the responsibility for the failure of incorporated standards to keep
up with voluntary consensus standards.335 Rulemaking requires resources that agencies
have in short supply; changing an incorporated standard is expensive. But the OFR
position is not required by the APA’s text336 and runs contrary to the expectation
under the NTTAA that standards will be “technical” and not “regulatory standards or
requirements.”337 One readily imagines rules that directly state regulatory requirements
and invoke standards as illustrative but not required means of compliance, permitting
agencies to use guidance documents at lower procedural cost, and without creating law,
to identify alternative means of compliance as standards evolve. Such an approach
would appear to be better both for SDOs—their copyrights are not threatened when
their standards are not converted into legal obligations—and for agencies acquiring
flexibility for change.
Consider, in this regard, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.200(c), an element of OSHA’s safety
and health regulations for construction section:
(c) Caution signs. (1) Caution signs (see Figure G-2) shall be
used only to warn against potential hazards or to caution against
unsafe practices.
(2) Caution signs shall have yellow as the predominating color;
black upper panel and borders: yellow lettering of “caution” on the
black panel; and the lower yellow panel for additional sign word-
ing. Black lettering shall be used for additional wording.
333 1 C.F.R. § 51 (2013).
334 See 1 C.F.R. § 51.1(f); supra note 179 and accompanying text.
335 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
336 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
337 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. Emily Schleicher Bremer, whose research
and report underlay the ACUS recommendations discovered in interviews with career rule
writers who have worked on incorporations by reference for decades that the limitation to tech-
nical material used to be more rigidly enforced. See Bremer, supra note 219; see also E-mail
from Emily Schleicher Bremer, Attorney Advisor, ACUS, to author (Dec. 14, 2012) (on file
with author). Scott J. Rafferty, who worked at the ACUS while her report was under develop-
ment, made a similar observation in his comments to the OMB docket. See Rafferty, OMB
Comment, supra note 179.
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(3) Standard color of the background shall be yellow; and the panel,
black with yellow letters. Any letters used against the yellow back-
ground shall be black. The colors shall be those of opaque glossy
samples as specified in Table 1 of American National Standard
Z53.1-1967.338
This regulation states a mandatory standard, putting a caution sign using some other
colors than those of “opaque glossy samples as specified in Table 1 of American
National Standard Z53.1-1967”339 in violation, however minor, and exposing the com-
pany posting it to sanctions, however slight. Adopted in 1967, Standard Z53.1-1967 is
now defunct,340 having apparently been displaced by ANSI standard Z535 SET;341 it
cannot be found in ANSI’s electronic library of standards.342 Yet, because it remains
under copyright, one would have to pay ANSI to obtain access to it, if it could be found
in print form. And if OSHA wished to bring its regulation up to date, incorporating
ANSI standard Z535 SET, it would have to go to the trouble (and expense) of convening
notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings to do so.343 As an alternative, imagine a
regulation taking this form:
(c) Caution signs. (1) Caution signs (see Figure G-2) shall be used
only to warn against potential hazards or to caution against un-
safe practices.
338 29 C.F.R. § 1926.200(c) (2012). Part 1926 runs 695 pages in the print version of the
latest Code of Federal Regulations, but that dimension seriously understates its effective vol-
ume. In them, one regularly encounters formulas like 200(c).
339 § 1910.145(d)(4).
340 ANSI, U.S. FED. REG. UPDATE: JUNE 11, 2013–JUNE 17, 2013 (June 2013) [hereinafter
U.S. FED. REG. UPDATE], available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Govern
ment%20Affairs/Federal%20Register%20Notices/Standards%20_%20CA%20Notices/2013
/06%2017%2013.pdf.
341 Id.
342 See ANSI Online Document Library, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/library/overview.aspx
?menuid=11 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
343 See U.S. FED. REG. UPDATE, supra note 340. Note in this respect that Z535 SET is a com-
plex collection of six different collections of standards, revised every five years, that both ANSI
and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), the responsible SDO, offer
for sale on their websites for $518. ANSI/NEMA Z535 SET, NEMA, http://www.nema.org
/Standards/Pages/ANSI-Z535-Set.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). The associated color chart
can be purchased separately for $36. ANSI Z535 Color Chart, NEMA, http://www.nema.org
/Standards/Pages/ANSI-Z535-Color-Chart.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). A September 2012
NEMA publication discusses in some detail marketing strategies and a continuing effort to get
OSHA to update its 1968 standard. ANSI, NEMA STANDARDS STRATEGIC MARKETING PLAN
(Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://workspaces.nema.org/public/temp/Shared%20Documents
/Z535%20Business%20Plan_2013_Final.pdf.
2013] PRIVATE STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 551
(2) Caution signs shall have yellow as the predominating color;
black upper panel and borders: yellow lettering of “caution” on the
black panel; and the lower yellow panel for additional sign word-
ing. Black lettering shall be used for additional wording.
(3) Standard color of the background shall be opaque glossy yel-
low; and the panel, opaque glossy black with opaque glossy yellow
letters. Any letters used against the yellow background shall be
opaque glossy black.
(4) Compliance with this regulation may be assured by the use of
opaque glossy yellow and opaque glossy black colors as defined by
ANSI standard Z535 SET, or such other standards as may be listed
from time to time as “compliance standards” in OSHA’s electronic
reading room.
Subsection (4) identifies one safe harbor and permits OSHA readily to identify others;
because it does not convert ANSI standard Z535 SET into a legal obligation, it does not
threaten ANSI’s copyright.344 Indeed, writing the regulation in this way would, quite de-
sirably, preserve possible competition among SDOs, protect SDO copyright revenues
(subject to market competition in standards), and avoid any need for further rulemaking.
OSHA’s list would constitute a form of guidance, and by itself making the listing deter-
mination, any issue of delegation of lawmaking into private hands would be avoided.345
Indeed, the distinction between legal requirements and standards identifying means
of compliance characterizes other systems that have faced these issues. The British
Standards Institute (BSI), for example, presents the more than 30,000 standards it offers
for sale on its website as “designed for voluntary use”346 and do not impose any regula-
tions, by law. In comments to the OMB Federal Register notice347 it associated this
approach with one generally followed in Europe, strongly supporting a “distinction be-
tween mandatory Regulations and the voluntary standards that provide a useful but non-
exclusive, means of compliance with them . . . essential requirements and voluntary
means of compliance.”348 The use of standards as law is simply refused and privately
344 Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.200 (2012).
345 Cf. supra Part II.B.
346 What is a Standard?, BSI, http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/standards/Information-about
-standards/what-is-a-standard/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
347 Comment from Dr. Scott Steedman, BSI, OMB-2012-0003-0063 (June 1, 2012), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2012-0003-0063.
348 Id. at 2 (“Compliance with a ‘harmonized standard’ gives a presumption of compliance
with some or all of the essential requirements of a Directive but anybody is free to choose alter-
native routes to demonstrating compliance. [Standards are created] through a process that will
have involved industry, consumers and government representatives, and all standards are sub-
mitted to a period of open public enquiry during which any person may submit a comment.”).
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developed standards are instead identified as means for compliance with separately
stated regulatory obligations. European courts regularly refuse the status of law to stan-
dards generated by private organizations as inconsistent with democratic principles.349
The “New Approach” of the European Union uses law (directives) to establish the es-
sential requirements that European products must meet to be marketable in its single
market;350 one can then demonstrate compliance with those requirements independently
or by showing the satisfaction of standards developed by European or national standards
organizations to identify complying products.351 And the adequacy of those standards
to meet the “Essential Requirements” is itself open to question. They are not, in them-
selves, legally binding, but rather have a force similar to that of “guidance” in American
administrative practice.352 In such a context, the issue of copyrighting “law” does not
arise. One may be certain that most—if not all—persons faced with the need to comply
with essential requirements will choose the “standards” route to satisfaction; yet as they
are not compelled to do so, they are free to compare the price of that route with such
alternatives as may be available to them.
In requiring publication in the Federal Register not only of “substantive rules of
general applicability” but also “statements of general policy and interpretations of gen-
eral applicability formulated and adopted by the agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) clearly
opens the door to incorporation by reference of the latter instruments, and one readily
imagines a means for the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to present such incorpo-
rations.353 The agency would publish a notice in the Federal Register that it is incor-
porating by reference ASME Standard XYZ–2013 as one that it has determined will
satisfy the requirements of an identified one of its regulations. As appropriate, the CFR
This approach is desirable in focusing regulators on identifying the essential needs, yet not
freezing the means of getting there—thus both reducing their need for technical expertise and
permitting ready change with developing technology. “Because standards referenced in regula-
tions are not mandatory they are not official documents and their ownership (including copy-
right) usually rests with private standards organizations.” Id. at 3.
The BSI comments also address issues of public availability, and the importance to the BSI
of a private status that would be compromised by law-creation. The BSI places its standards
with educational institutions and libraries on favorable terms, permitting free access by students
and the public for reference purposes. Id. at 3. The BSI would strongly resist government con-
version of standards into regulations, as it would then lose its independent status; and, it is not
elected. Id. at 4. Its comments assert that this is, indeed, the general European view, citing a
Dutch case and German law and providing a British example about baby carriages. Id. at 4–5.
Better practice is for agencies to maintain website lists of standards they find to meet the re-
quirements of their regulations (as distinct from providing that the most current standard will
always suit, which would be an excessive delegation). Id. at 6.
349 BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5, at 17, 66 n.25.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 17.
352 Id.
353 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006).
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presentations of a regulation would be annotated with a simple list of those voluntary
consensus standards the agency had concluded would meet its requirements.
A recent book, Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli’s The New Global Rulers: The Privati-
zation of Regulation in the World Economy,354 explores contrasts between American
and international standards practices in considerable detail. In a global economy, tech-
nical standards that differ across countries can become substantial trade barriers—the
proposition that lies behind the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) continuing con-
cern with non-tariff barriers to trade.355 Whereas in the United States standards develop-
ment organizations are many—potential competitors, with only some of them under
the relatively loose supervisory aegis of the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI)356—standards organizations in other economies are typically national or, like
the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) or the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), multinational.357 The BSI’s tight hierarchical control over the
work done by subordinate groups, CEN’s ability to set single standards for the European
market, both assure national—or international—uniformity and, given its resulting polit-
ical significance, result in more balanced representation in its deliberations358 than
ANSI can assure across the hundreds of competing American standards developing
organizations, many of which are not within its aegis or choose on occasion not to sub-
mit their standards to its certification.359
354 BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5, at 17.
355 Id. at 6, 134.
356 See Sagers, Standardization and Markets, supra note 204, at 795–97.
357 BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5, at 15, 57.
358 [In Europe,] most national standard bodies are subject to governmental
regulation. In exchange for usually providing partial public funding, these
rules require each national standards organization to have representatives
from a wide range of interests on technical committees . . . [including]
trade unions, consumer groups . . . socioeconomic interest groups, minis-
tries, and public agencies . . . . In short, a standard adopted in Europe
typically is the result of the involvement of representatives of a broad
range of social interests . . . . Such broad-based involvement, however, is
neither easy nor automatic because participation in standardization can
be quite costly and is non-remunerative . . . . Europeans therefore recog-
nize a need for subsidies to weaker groups; such assistance is viewed as
a prerequisite for genuine openness and due process. In sharp contrast,
most American standards organizations contend that willingness to pay
is the best measure of interest in the process and see no need for finan-
cial assistance.
Id. at 154–57.
359 Coordination and cooperation do not arise spontaneously among compet-
ing standard-setters, and . . . [there is] a long tradition of keeping govern-
ment at arms’ length. . . . In the absence of government control or any
other central monitoring and coordinating agent, the American system for
product standardization is characterized by extreme pluralism and con-
testation . . . . ANSI remains a weak institution, even though it formally
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American standards organizations repeatedly assert the superiority of the competi-
tive, loosely organized American system, yet what it gains domestically it may lose in
the international context. Büthe and Mattli seem able to demonstrate that with the
growth of Europe as a single market, the tightly coordinated standards have often
prevailed.360 National standards organizations speak in CEN or ISO with an authority
that ANSI cannot command.361 And the result, they assert, is to disadvantage domestic
American market participants.362 American multinationals may learn about and be in a
position to influence these standards, but wholly American firms will not363—another
way in which standards processes may serve to favor the largest market participants.
Thus, they report, a 1988 EU directive on the safety of toys led to development of stan-
dards by CEN which were then accepted verbatim as ISO standards, producing “not
only a de facto requirement for exporting to the European market, but also for exporting
to many other international markets.”364 American manufacturers lacking European
is the sole representative of U.S. interests in international standards
organizations . . . . Private U.S. standards organizations, which derive 50
to 80 percent of their income from the sale of their proprietary standards
documents . . . fear that a more centralized system would rob them of
these revenues and eclipse their power and autonomy.
Id. at 149–51; see also Comment from Michael J. Lynch, Vice President, Illinois Tool Works,
Inc., OMB-2012-0003-0047 (May 7, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D
=OMB-2012-0003-0047 (reporting that an ANSI-accredited body had withheld a possibly vul-
nerable standard from ANSI (so the ANSI appeal process was not available) yet used their
ANSI accreditation as a basis for securing its inclusion in the International Building Code).
[T]he financial benefits resulting from the sale of the standard in copy-
righted materials published both by the SDO and the code body provided
an undue incentive to have the standard accepted. . . . ANSI has discov-
ered that this was not an isolated incident. In fact such claims are made
often enough that ANSI has devised a name for the practice: the HALO
Effect. To our knowledge, the conditions resulting in this phenomenon
have not been reformed by ANSI.
Id.
360 BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5, at 148–58.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 148–51.
363 “A U.S. multinational with a subsidiary in Germany, for instance, could send its standards
experts via its subsidiary to sit on DIN technical committees and therefore on CEN commit-
tees.” Id. at 160–61. Multinationals, too, may be at risk absent adequate measures to enforce
WTO and ANSI standards of good practice. Illinois Tool Works, a global manufacturer, told
the OMB that it had “experienced directly the manipulation of a U.S. standards development
committee process leading to a standard created to benefit a single manufacturer and its
European Union–patented product to the detriment of U.S. producers.” Comment from Michael
J. Lynch, supra note 359. The participating federal employee from the agency that would
convert this voluntary standard to a legal requirement was under no duty to report the objec-
tions made.
364 BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 5, at 163.
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subsidiaries learned about the process too late to participate in ISO consensus proce-
dures—many, not until after the ISO vote—resulting in lost market share and/or a
costly need to retool.365 In contrast, American firms seeking in the early 2000s to estab-
lish an ANSI/ASME standard for the optics industry as an ISO standard failed almost
completely. “European manufacturers quickly learned of this proposal and realized that
the changes would impose on them costs estimated at several billion euros for German
industry alone,” and their efforts in response resulted in an ISO standard “much closer
to European preferences.”366 In 2009, the ASME withdrew its competing standard and
“U.S. optics industry organizations started to adopt the ISO standard instead.”367
One might note that, to the extent the existence of competing standards and stan-
dards development organizations is an asset of the American system, any incorporation
by reference that carries the force of law undermines it. If each of three competing
voluntary consensus standards may satisfy a given regulatory need, market forces will
tend to control price even if we assume consumers will feel driven to purchase one or
another of the three. If one of the competing standards developers is able to secure the
incorporation of its standard as law, the result is not only both (1) to confer monopoly
pricing power on that developer (if it is permitted to charge the public for access to it)
and (2) to have the tendency to freeze the standard in place, given the obstacles to rule-
making change, but (3) it also is anti-competitive behavior vis-à-vis the other two
SDOs.368 An SDO’s ability to continue to charge a premium price for an incorporated
standard even after it has been superceded as a voluntary consensus standard—but
before the governing law has been changed—is much harder to rationalize in terms of
an appropriate SDO business model, than its ability to charge market prices for access
to its voluntary consensus standards during their useful life as contemporaneous expres-
sions of useful technical measures.369 One perhaps understands SDO enthusiasm for
converting their standards into law in these terms—so long as their ability to charge the
public for learning them remains—but that makes the government’s continued complic-
ity in the process more striking.
IV. CHANGING PART 51
Although the ACUS Recommendations addressed only the practices of agencies
using incorporation by reference in rulemaking,370 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) places responsi-
bility for the regulation of incorporation by reference practice in the hands of the
Director of the Office of the Federal Register (OFR).371 That statute permits the Director
365 Id.
366 Id. at 164.
367 Id.
368 See supra Introduction.C.
369 See, e.g., supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
370 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
371 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006).
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to allow incorporation by reference of material otherwise required to be published in the
Federal Register only on determining that it will be “reasonably available” to those af-
fected by it372—a concept initially grounded in the expectation that commercial pub-
lishing houses would be including incorporated materials in their widely distributed,
market-priced collections.373
Earlier pages sought to show the inadequacies of the OFR’s 1982 regulations in
establishing the framework for these judgments.374 Unadapted to the Computer Age,
Part 51 imagines that only print copies need be available and, as administered, availabil-
ity in public sources need be in two places only—the National Archives and the adopt-
ing agency’s own central library.375 Beyond that, the regulations lack attention to
continued availability, as they also lack attention to the price that copyright holders may
ask for access to them from their hands.376 Part 51 requires that for regulations to be
incorporated, they must impose legal obligations, and only one identified version of
the standard may be incorporated,377 effectively requiring new rulemaking should the
agency wish to follow SDO revisions over time.378 Despite the impulses of the NTTAA
and Circular A-119 to limit incorporations to “technical standard[s]” and not “regulatory
standards or requirements,”379 any voluntary consensus standard may incorporated; nor
is there apparent concern whether, to access the incorporated material, a consumer may
obtain only the matter incorporated from the adopting SDO, or rather must purchase the
whole of the standard as the SDO may have packaged it.
The following paragraphs briefly address the notice of proposed rulemaking the
OFR published just as this Article was entering its final editing process.380 Better devel-
oped comments will doubtless be found in the FDMS docket established for the
rulemaking, which, when last seen, permitted comments to be filed until January 31,
2014.381 But it is already clear that the OFR’s proposal will not meet the needs of the
372 Id.
373 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
374 See supra Part II.
375 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. One might think “reasonably available”
copies of municipal ordinance adoptions by reference maintained at the city clerk’s office—
and states’ and local governments’ too—are migrating from physical to digital records. To re-
gard two copies—both located in Washington, D.C.—as reasonably available for inspection
to the country is unsustainable.
376 See, e.g., supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
377 1 C.F.R. § 51 (2013).
378 See supra Part II.A.
379 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8549 (Feb. 19, 1998).
380 Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-02/pdf/2013-24217.pdf.
381 See, e.g., Recently Posted NARA Rules and Notices, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www
.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=NARA_FRDOC_0001 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013); see also
Incorporation by Reference; Response to Petition and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=OFR-2013-0001 (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
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current day. The same reduction of governmental resources for regulation that has con-
tributed to agencies’ increasing reliance on privately generated standards—and reduced
their capacity to monitor their creation382—may help to explain, if not excuse, its defi-
ciencies; the preamble to the notice repeatedly invokes the OFR’s resource limitations
as well as making what, in the author’s view, are incorrect disclaimers of legal
authority.383 When Part 51 was adopted in 1982, the legal affairs staff working on
IBR—along with many other legal issues for the Federal Register—was three or four
times the size it is today (three).384 Yet Computer-Age-oriented changes in the Federal
Register and in another of the National Archives’ activities have won both of the annual
awards for innovation in government services that the Administrative Conference has
conferred to date;385 accommodating incorporation by reference to the resources of the
Computer Age seems an obvious further step, made the more imperative by the require-
ments of E-Government386 and E-FOIA.387 Strikingly, no reference to electronic docu-
mentation may be found in the changes the OFR has proposed to Part 51; in defining
usability of material incorporated by reference, “[w]hether it is bound, numbered, and
organized” remains a requirement.388
Like the current regulation, the proposed amendments fail as well to suggest any
meaning for “reasonably available,” the condition § 552(a)(1) requires the Director to
find met before permitting any incorporation by reference.389 As proposed, § 51.5(a)(2)
would require agencies to discuss in the preamble to a final rule “the ways in which
it worked to make the materials it incorporates by reference reasonably available to
interested parties and how interested parties can obtain the materials.”390 Of course,
it is useful to give agencies the incentive to think about the question of reasonable
382 See supra Part II.B.
383 Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 60,784–85.
384 E-mail from Emily Schleicher Bremer, supra note 337.
385 The first prize was for the transformed Federal Register. Press Release, National
Archives, FederalRegister.gov Honored for Innovation and Best Practices in Government
(Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2012/nr12-46.html.
The second prize was for NARA’s Citizen Archivist Initiative. Press Release, National
Archives, National Archives Honored for Innovations and Practices in Government (Dec. 20,
2012) [hereinafter Dec. 20 National Archives Press Release], available at http://www.archives
.gov/press/press-releases/2013/nr13-35.html.
386 Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
387 Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996). For digitizing the thousands of incorporated,
but almost inevitably superannuated, standards that remain “law” today, and are available only
in print form, one might create a citizens’ archivist project, the initiative that won NARA’s
second Walter Gellhorn award for innovation. See Dec. 20 National Archives Press Release,
supra note 385.
388 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(4)(ii) (2013) (emphasis added).
389 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006).
390 Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,797 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-02/pdf/2013-24217.pdf.
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availability—but the failures to essay any definition that might guide those efforts, to
address electronic availability, or temporal availability avoid legal responsibilities that
the statute clearly places in the Director.391 Creation of a digital archive of incorporated
standards to replace (or supplement) the current physical archive, under digital rights
management to the extent that might be necessary, would satisfy the self-evident min-
imum standard of reasonable availability in the Computer Age. It would assure a persist-
ing resource for standards that can remain law long after they have been replaced in
the compendia of the SDOs that have created them.392 (Although, as remarked above,393
ANSI has announced its own commendable efforts to create such a resource, having
such a portal in the same electronic place as the CFR, with consequent ease of linkage,
is preferable.) One advantage of such a portal would be the possibility of lifting any
digital rights management regime that might be in place while the incorporated matter
remained the active voluntary consensus standard of the SDO that created it, once that
standard has been revised—the point at which the law “on the books” ceases to embody
the contemporary voluntary consensus standard.
The OFR proposal also fails to propose eliminating the current standard that incor-
porated matter must be a “requirement.” The straightforward language of § 552(a)(1)
permits incorporation by reference of agency guidance documents,394 and acting on that
language would require little, if any, administration by the OFR. The problem of aging
incorporations the “requirement” condition has generated would disappear were the
OFR to permit, even express a preference for, incorporations that invoke the European
model,395 independently stating regulatory requirements and then identifying a voluntary
consensus standard as one (but not necessarily the only) means by which those require-
ments can be met. Since agency rulemaking would not then be required to identify
additional standards meeting those requirements, the modernity and flexibility of rules
would be enhanced, and the need for rulemakings calling on the OFR for judgment re-
duced. Each year’s edition (and the electronic version) of the CFR could then present
as notes to particular regulatory requirements any standards the responsible agency had
identified as permitting their satisfaction. Availability would then be assured, and be-
cause guidance is not law, the OFR would have no occasion to consider the reasonable-
ness of SDO pricing or the problem of copyrighting law.
391 For example, a definition of reasonable availability might require agencies to demonstrate
in their submissions for the Director’s approval that they had limited the material incorporated
to the minimum extent required for their regulatory purposes. For instance, incorporating only
the definition of “dent” contained in a much more extensive collection of voluntary consensus
standards applicable to tank trucks. See supra note 325 and accompanying text. Doing so could
permit inclusion of just that material in the electronic archive of incorporated standards, a fair
use, without significant threat to SDO financial interests.
392 See supra notes 325–27 and accompanying text.
393 Bhatia & Shannon Remarks, supra note 216.
394 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
395 See supra notes 346–59 and accompanying text.
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At least one change proposed by the OFR’s notice of proposed rulemaking would
inappropriately ratify the use of voluntary consensus standards to substitute for agency
regulation. Recall that the NTTAA and OMB Circular A-119 have in view “technical
standard[s],” not “regulatory standards or requirements.”396 The current language of
1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a) correspondingly requires that incorporated matter be “published data,
criteria, standards, specifications, techniques, illustrations, or similar material”397 as
well as that it “[s]ubstantially reduces the volume of material published in the Federal
Register,”398 albeit this limitation has been honored in the breach. This would tend to
limit incorporated standards to matters generally in ways uninteresting to the public.
Indeed, from that perspective, placing the incorporated matter outside the idea of “law”
that citizens must be able to access to know their obligations. The OFR proposal would
substitute “or” for “and” between the two quoted clauses, explicitly permitting—as to
date no statute or regulation has—the incorporation by reference of regulatory obliga-
tions (so long as their incorporation would reduce the volume of materials in the Federal
Register).399 It is not only that the Electronic Age makes this criterion unnecessary;
explicitly permitting the incorporation by reference of regulatory obligations would take
us a step back into secret law.
To the extent incorporations by reference persist that do importantly take on the
characteristics of “law,” that are unmistakably “regulatory standards or requirements,”400
it is hard to avoid the conclusion that knowledge of them is the citizen’s right and that
monopoly pricing power over that knowledge cannot properly be conferred by recogniz-
ing copyright in them after the fact of their incorporation. Placing that information in
an electronic archive under digital rights management could succeed in preserving the
responsible SDO’s principal markets for its standards while accommodating that claim
of right. That any financial consequences of being found to have taken private property
by converting it into public law would fall on the adopting agency should operate as
an incentive for the agency to bargain in advance, should it know this is the outcome
it wishes, or to act in ways that maximally preserve SDO value when after the indepen-
dent development of a voluntary consensus standard it discovers its regulatory rele-
vance. Part 51 ought to be reconstructed in ways that reduce, if not eliminate, this field
of conflict,401 and that is the effort the OFR should undertake.
CONCLUSION
John Conley, the Washington lawyer who chaired the Committee responsible for
the ACUS Recommendations, aptly described the central conflict that has animated
396 See supra note 201.
397 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(2) (2013).
398 § 51.7(a)(3).
399 Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-02/pdf/2013-24217.pdf.
400 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8549 (Feb. 19, 1998).
401 See supra Part II.C, Part III.
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this discussion as a “wicked question.”402 The SDO community, valuable—essential—
to effective regulation in the twenty-first century, requires the income generated by
the sales of its uncontroversially copyrighted voluntary consensus standards to continue
its work. And yet once such a standard has been converted into a legal obligation
through its incorporation by reference, the proposition that law is not subject to copy-
right rears its head. If this conflict is not readily resolved, can it be eased? Can the
abuses and failures set out in the preceding pages be avoided?
The preceding discussion has identified a number of measures by which ANSI or
individual SDOs might improve their chances of preserving the income stream they
receive from the sale of their voluntary consensus standards that are subject to agency
conversion into legal obligations:
• Integrate with their standards explanatory materials or explanations that
will not be incorporated elements and will enhance the value of the stan-
dards in users’ hands;
• Avoid conflict with established federal rulemaking norms by assuring
would-be commenters some form of free access to standards proposed for
incorporation by reference during rulemaking notice-and-comment periods,
and providing rulemaking agencies with complete records of their stan-
dards development process;
• Create an archive controlled by digital rights management techniques for
access to standards once incorporated;
• Work with agencies to limit incorporations by reference where possible to
relevant parts, and not the whole, of voluntary consensus standards, thus
reducing the stakes in having the incorporated portions made public and
arguably heightening the value of the standards as a whole;
• Price standards as voluntary consensus standards, making any standard that
incorporation has converted into legal obligations freely available once the
adoption of a revised voluntary consensus standard effectively converts
any further sales of it into a sale of law;
• Encourage agencies to follow the European model, using standards as
accepted means of compliance with regulation rather than as regulatory
obligations per se.
Agencies, in turn, can take steps that minimize the threats to these valuable partners’
proper claims to compensation for the public’s use of their work product:
• When an agency effectively initiates the process by seeking the develop-
ment of a standard to be incorporated, take the contractual route of pur-
chasing the desired standard for an agreed price rather than permitting its
price to be passed along to the affected public;
402 John Conley, Partner at Venable LLP, Keynote Speech at the ANSI Legal Issues Con-
ference Panel on Incorporation by Reference (Oct. 10, 2012), discussed in Experts Discuss
Incorporation by Reference at the ANSI Legal Issues Forum, ANSI (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www
.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=3412.
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• Where at all possible, follow the European approach of stating regulatory
requirements directly, and identifying incorporated standards as assured
but not required means for complying therewith.
• Restrict the use of incorporation by reference, as the NTTAA and OMB
Circular A-119 anticipate, to technical standards, and not “regulatory stan-
dards or requirements”;403
• Implement the ACUS recommendations to develop measures permitting
limited access during rulemaking comment periods;
• Obtain, and incorporate in agency records during the rulemaking comment
period, full SDO and ANSI records of the development of the standard
proposed to be incorporated, including the resolution of any conflicts oc-
curring at the time;
• Incorporate by reference only those elements of a voluntary consensus
standard essential to its regulation, then made public if they create legal
obligations;
• Make incorporated standards public, as by posting them on agency web-
sites, as soon as their status as voluntary consensus standards has been
ended by SDO revision of them;
Most important, however, are the steps that the Office of Federal Register should take—
and apparently will refuse to take—in revising and administering its regulations im-
plementing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
403 OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8549 (Feb. 19, 1998).
